THE SCOPE OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION IN

PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
ETHAN LOCK*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The two most significant events in the professional sports industry in
1987 occurred off the field and beyond the focus of most sports fans. The
media regarded these two events with only slightly less indifference than
the fans.' The first event took place on June 14, 1987, at the conclusion
of the National Basketball Association (NBA) playoffs, when the 1983
NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement and the eleven-year, court supervised Oscar Robertson Settlement Agreement simultaneously expired. 2
The second followed some two months later on August 31, 1987, when
the 1982 National Football League (NFL) collective bargaining agree3
ment expired.
Both the leagues and players' associations anticipated long and difficult negotiations over a new collective bargaining agreement, along with
* J.D. 1977, University of North Carolina. Consultant, G.B.A. Sportsworld. The author
acknowledges Professor Michael Berch, Arizona State University College of Law, for his comments
and suggestions, and Robert Hunter of the Grateful Dead, whose lyrics below from the song "Uncle
John's Band" aptly describe the twenty some years of struggle between labor and management in the
NFL:
"God damn, well I declare,
have you seen the like?
Their walls are built of cannon balls;
their motto is: "Don't tread on me."
Finally and most importantly, the author acknowledges Kaia Tate Lock, whose love and affection
provided the inspiration for this article.
1. Perhaps because the expiration of the 1983 National Basketball Association (NBA) agreement coincided with the final game of the 1987 NBA Championship Series, neither the Los Angeles
Times, the Washington Post, nor the Arizona Republic acknowledged the expiration of the 1983
agreement in their June 14, 1987 editions. On August 31, 1987, the Washington Post briefly noted
on an inside page of its sports section that the 1982 National Football League (NFL) agreement
expired at midnight and, in a few lines, mentioned the issues in the negotiations. Wash. Post, Aug.
31, 1987, § C, at 2, col. 1. The Arizona Republic's brief story on the expiration of the agreement
appeared on page seven of its sports section. NFL Players Association Expected to Announce Strike
Deadline Today, Ariz. Republic, Aug. 31, 1987, § D, at 7, col. 1. The Los Angeles Times failed to
mention the expiration of the NFL agreement in its August 31, 1987 edition.
2. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D.N.J. 1987). The Robertson settlement
agreement was a 1976 court approved settlement agreement of a class action suit filed by NBA
players in 1970. Id.; see also infra note 15 (contains partial text of agreement).
3. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League Management
Council and the National Football League Players Association art. XXXVIII (Dec. 11, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement].
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the use of economic weapons and legal action. The NBA and National
Basketball Players Association (NBPA), while unsuccessfully attempting

to reach a new agreement, executed a moratorium on legal action and the
signing of players. 4 In the NFL, the bitter history of labor relations suggested the possibility of unfair labor practice charges, the use of economic weapons, and even antitrust litigation. 5 NFL owners prepared for
a strike by making plans to continue the regular season with replacement
6
players.
Legal action did follow in both disputes. At the expiration of the

NBA-NBPA moratorium agreement, and after negotiations had reached

7
a standstill, the NBPA filed an antitrust suit against the League. Similarly, the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) filed
an antitrust action against the NFL on October 15, 1987, the final day of

the union's fifth strike in its relatively brief history. 8 In each antitrust
suit, the players' association alleged that the league's continuation of various player restraints in the respective expired agreement violated section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 9
Although faced with complex antitrust claims filed against the
leagues, the initial issue before each court involved only the threshold
question of the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption.10 Does the
nonstatutory labor exemption, an exemption that immunizes terms in a
collective bargaining agreement from antitrust attack, expire simultane4. The parties executed the "moratorium agreement" on June 8, 1987. See Bridgeman, 675 F.
Supp. at 963.
5. See infra notes 114-71 and accompanying text.
6. Power, FootballGames Are Cancelled, Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 25, 1987, § A, at 1, col.
1.
7. The "moratorium" period expired on October 1, 1987. See Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at
963.
8. The NFLPA strike ended after'24 days. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 780-81 (D.
Minn. 1988).
9. Id. at 778. For a discussion of the Sherman Act and basic antitrust doctrine, see infra notes
20-32 and accompanying text.
10. The NFLPA moved for partial summary judgment, alleging that the NFL had willfully
acquired or maintained monopoly power, and for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the League from
continuing the right of first refusal/compensation system. The League filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, alleging that the challenged restraints were insulated from antitrust scrutiny by
operation of the nonstatutory labor exemption. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781.
The NBPA filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the labor exemption to the
antitrust laws was inapplicable to the restraints in its dispute with the NBA. In its cross motion for
summary judgment, the NBA declared that the challenged restraints were immunized from antitrust
attack by operation of the nonstatutory labor exemption. As the New Jersey district court noted,
none of these motions addressed the underlying merits of the plaintiffs' antitrust claims. Rather, the
motions involved the threshold question whether the challenged practices were insulated from antitrust attack by the nonstatutory labor exemption. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 961 & n.l.
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ously with the collective bargaining agreement?11 Defining the appropriate scope of the labor exemption will affect the relative bargaining power
of the parties in future negotiations. It will, therefore, affect the future of
collective bargaining in professional sports. Without the ability to protect their rights under the antitrust laws, the unions will undoubtedly
approach the bargaining table in a significantly weaker position. In fact,
a reading of the labor exemption that, in essence, removes the antitrust
laws as a potential remedy for antitrust violations could jeopardize the
12
existence of professional sports unions.
Because of the particular significance of the bargaining history in the
NFL, 13 and the fact that the NBPA suit was recently settled when the
NBPA and NBA reached a new agreement, 14 this article limits its analy-

sis of the labor exemption to the facts in the NFL dispute. Though the
two disputes raise virtually identical legal issues, factual differences relevant to the application of the labor exemption distinguish the two
cases.1 5 Nonetheless, the conclusion reached on the facts of the NFL
11. For a discussion of the labor exemption, see infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text. In
each dispute, the collective bargaining agreement had expired before the union filed the antitrust
suit. For the factual background of each dispute, see Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779-81; Bridgeman,
675 F. Supp. at 961-63.
12. Professional sports is one of the few industries in which individual and collective bargaining
exist side by side. Players' associations traditionally have waived their right to negotiate salaries
above the league minimum, thereby permitting individual players to establish salaries through direct
negotiations with their teams. See, e.g., 1982 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3,
art. XXII. The average annual salary in the NBA is approximately $500,000, an amount the NBPA
estimates equals approximately 90% of total player compensation. See Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Declaratory Relief and Opposition Memorandum to Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Bridgeman, 675 F.
Supp. at 960-61. Although the percentage of total compensation NFL players receive from individual negotiations is undoubtedly less than 90%, see NFLPA Stat Sheet, Winter 1988-89 (average
team salaries at $15 million and other player benefits at approximately $4 million per team), a significant portion of players in both the NBA and NFL could reasonably conclude that eliminating restrictions that impede individual negotiations is a higher priority than bargaining for other benefits.
Thus, a judicial determination that the challenged restraints are exempt from the antitrust laws by
virtue of the union's existence might induce the players to decertify the union. Not surprisingly, a
majority of NBA players recently voted to decertify the NBPA in the event that the courts conclude
that the labor exemption immunizes restrictions on free agency from antitrust attack. See Cosell,
Best Way to Preserve Unions Is to Destroy Them, N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 6, 1988, at 60. At a meeting
of the Board of Player Representatives at the NBA All-Star Game on February 1, 1988, the Board
authorized the NBPA to circulate petitions among the players authorizing the union to decertify.
Those petitions were subsequently signed by the players and returned to the NBPA.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 114-48.
14. The NBA and NBPA reached an agreement (covering right of first refusal, salary cap, and
the draft) and settled the lawsuit on April 26, 1988. See 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement
Between National Basketball Association and National Basketball Players Association, (Apr. 26,
1988).
15. The factual distinction most directly related to the current dispute involved an interpretation of a particular provision of the Robertson settlement agreement. See supra note 2 (explanation
of settlement agreement). The Robertson settlement agreement contained the following clause:
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dispute applies fully to the NBA dispute. Moreover, many arguments
raised in the NBA dispute clearly speak to the legal issues in the NFL
16
dispute and, as a result, are addressed in this article.

This article covers the legal background of the current NFL dispute

in section II. A brief discussion of the Sherman Act and its application
to player restraints similar to those currently challenged precedes a general discussion of the nonstatutory labor exemption. Section III summarizes the current NFL dispute. 17 This section presents a discussion of the
(d) Neither the settlement of the Class Action, nor entry into this Stipulation and Settlement Agreement or any collective bargaining agreement or any Player Contract, nor the
effectuation thereof, nor any practice or course of dealing thereunder shall be deemed to be
a waiver or estoppel by any NBA player or players or the Players Association of their right
to challenge in a court of competent jurisdiction any future unilateral imposition by the
NBA or any NBA member of any rule, regulation, policy, practice or agreement, or to
contend (subject to the right of the NBA to contend otherwise) that the same is not a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining or a subject over which they are otherwise required to collectively bargain, nor do they concede that the same is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining or a subject over which they are otherwise required to collectively
bargain.
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement %b(d) at 47, Robertson v. NBA, 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
Other factual differences distinguish the bargaining relationship between the two leagues and
players' associations. In contrast to the bargaining history between the NBA and NBPA, for example, which has been mostly placid, the bargaining history between the NFL and NFLPA has been
marked by strikes, numerous unfair labor practices, and, most recently, replacement games. Moreover, the economic structures of the two leagues differ significantly on account of different approaches to revenue sharing. And although both leagues possess monopoly power, the NBA
acquired its monopoly as part of the Robertson settlement agreement and in exchange for liberalizing
rules concerning the intra-league movement of players, while the NFL acquired its monopoly
through a congressional exemption prior to the League's recognition of the NFLPA as the players'
bargaining agent. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1981). The extent to which these differences have or should
have an impact on the application of the labor exemption is discussed infra at notes 177-222 and
accompanying text.
An additional distinction between the two suits involves the college player draft. Notwithstanding the Second Circuit's opinion in Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1977) (labor exemption immunizes the draft during life of collective bargaining agreement even as to rookie players who
were not members of bargaining unit when agreement was negotiated), the NBPA also challenged
the NBA's college draft in its suit. Although the NFLPA did not challenge the NFL draft, the NFL
draft was challenged by Kelly Stouffer, a 1987 draft pick who failed to reach an agreement with the
St. Louis Cardinals and sat out the entire 1987 season. Stouffer motioned to intervene in the NFL v.
NFLPA case, but the action was settled immediately prior to the 1988 NFL college draft when
Stouffer was traded to and signed a contract with the Seattle Seahawks.
Admittedly, Wood and other cases hold that, for purposes of collective bargaining, the bargaining unit includes potential as well as current employees. See, e.g., Wood, 809 F.2d at 960 (NBA
draft choices). A union normally has authorization to negotiate conditions of entry into the bargaining unit on behalf of potential employees. Yet, the NFLPA's certification with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) excludes unsigned draft picks as members of the bargaining unit, Thus,
whatever the ultimate ruling in the current NFL-NFLPA dispute, the question whether the labor
exemption immunizes from attack by a potential employee a provision for the college draft contained
in an unexpired agreement will remain unanswered.
16. See infra notes 177-93, 217-26 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 81-222.
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unique nature of the bargaining relationship in professional sports and a
summary of the bargaining history between the National Football
League Management Council (NFLMC) and NFLPA regarding the
challenged restraints. Section III also reviews the recent Minnesota and
New Jersey district court holdings concerning the scope of the labor exemption in the professional sports context.
Section IV considers the owners arguments in the current disputes.1 8
Section V proposes an alternative analysis of the labor exemption within
the context of the current NFL-NFLPA dispute.1 9 This alternative analysis recognizes the significance of the bargaining history between the parties as well as the unique nature of the professional sports industry.
Finally, this analysis concludes that, within the context of the current
NFL-NFLPA dispute, the labor exemption did in fact expire on August
31, 1987, the day the 1982 NFLMC-NFLPA Collective Bargaining
Agreement ended.
II.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT DISPUTES

Application of Antitrust Laws to the Challenged Restraints

1. Antitrust Background. The purpose of federal antitrust law is
to promote competition. 20 Most substantive antitrust law derives from
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the original and
most basic piece of antitrust legislation. 2 1 Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are brief and very broad. Section 1 condemns every contract,
22
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade in interstate commerce.
Section 2 condemns monopolization, as well as attempts, combinations
and conspiracies to monopolize any part of interstate trade or
23
commerce.
Literally interpreted, section 1 of the Sherman Act would condemn
many legitimate and necessary business activities. 24 In the years following the enactment of the Sherman Act, however, the Supreme Court interpreted the general language of section 1 to ban only unreasonable
18. See infra text accompanying notes 223-319.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 320-93.
20. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) ("Sherman
Act is designed to promote national interest in a competitive economy"); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,
807 F.2d 520, 536 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Supreme Court... has instead stressed that the antitrust laws
seek to protect competition.").
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982); see also L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
14 (1977).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
23. Id. § 2.
24. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 165-66 (virtually any contract restrains trade to some
extent).
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restraints of trade.2 5 The test of illegality under section 1, therefore, has
become whether the particular restraint is unreasonable. The Court has
adopted two standards under which to analyze the reasonableness of a
26
particular restraint of trade: the rule of reason and the per se rule.

The rule of reason requires a court to evaluate the reasonableness of
the challenged restraint. It grants protection from section 1 liability to
arrangements that achieve pro-competitive objectives but have an incidental effect on competition. Among the factors considered by courts in
evaluating the reasonableness of a restraint are the history, purpose and
effect of the restraint;2 7 the existence of less restrictive alternatives to realize legitimate, pro-competitive objectives; 2 8 and the balance of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.2 9 The rule of reason is appropriately applied to situations in which courts have little experience with the
type of restraint in question, the industry is unique, or the restraint pro30
duces pro-competitive benefits.
Under the per se rule, courts invalidate, without inquiry, certain restraints of trade which are deemed inherently unreasonable. 31 The perse
rule is appropriately applied to situations in which courts have had sufficient experience with the challenged practice to conclude that the prac32
tice has no redeeming competitive virtues.
2. Antitrust and Professional Sports. The fotus of much of the
early antitrust litigation in the professional sports industry was on player
25. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918) ("true test of
legality" is whether the restraint "merely requests and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition"); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1911) (anticompetitive acts are tested by "the rule of reason, in
light of the principles of law and the public policy which the act embodies").
26. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 166.
27. See, eg., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(competitive effect analyzed by evaluating business involved, history of restraint, and reasons for
restraint); Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (same).
28. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (significantly
less anticompetitive alternatives exist to challenged draft system).
29. See, eg., ChicagoBd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (test of legality is whether restraint imposed
promotes or suppresses competition); Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188-89 (pro-competitive benefits must
offset anticompetitive effect).
30. See, eg., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (not enough known
about effect of vertical territorial limitation to apply per se rule); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911) (no per se rule with complex and varied business transactions);
Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977) (per se theory not
utilized without minimal indicia of anticompetitive effect; rather, rule of reason appropriate). For a
general discussion of the rule of reason, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 186-92.
31. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (under the per se rule
certain agreements or practices are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable).
32. Id. For a general discussion oftheperse rule, see supra L. SULLIVAN, note 21, at 192-94.
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restraints similar to those currently challenged by the NFLPA.3 3 In each
of the early cases, the leagues argued both that the unique nature of professional sports precluded application of the perse standard, and that the
restraints were reasonable under the rule of reason.3 4 According to the
leagues, their economic viability depended upon their controlling the

movement of players from team to team. 35 Profitability in professional
sports leagues turns on the unpredictable outcome of individual games

and championship races. 36 Absent restrictions on player movement,
players presumably would gravitate toward the most successful
franchises or those franchises in the largest markets, in an effort to get
the top dollar for their services. This movement would create an imbalance in team strengths and ultimately undermine fan interest and
37
revenues.
Thus, the restrictions on player movement, according to the leagues,
are designed, not to injure players, but rather to enable the leagues to
function. Competition, desirable in other industries, is neither desirable
nor feasible in the professional sports industry, so the argument goes.
Teams within a league are not economic competitors like firms in other
industries.3 8 A free market would destroy professional sports leagues.
33. See, eg., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1976) (Rozelle Rule), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 78 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (Rozelle Rule; tampering
rule), vacated in part, 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,543 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); see also Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 873-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (basketball draft; reserve clause; uniform player contract); Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey
reserve clause). For further discussion of the Rozelle Rule, see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text.

34. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn. 1976) (NFL defends Rozelle
Rule as reasonable restraint on trade) modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
801 (1977); see also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 594-95
(1979) (reviewing arguments for and against per se antitrust liability in sports industry).
35. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 34, at 596; see also Brown, Because of a Clause, A
Cause, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1972, at 62 (option clause necessary to league).
36. See, eg., H. DEMMERT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 10-11 (1973);
see also Noll, Alternatives in Sports Policy, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 411,415-17
(R. Noll ed. 1974) (arguing that limits on competition for players do not affect balance of competition among teams); Quirk & El Hodiri, The Economic Theory of a ProfessionalSports League, in
GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 33, 34-37 (R. Noll ed. 1974) (noting multitude of factors

impacting on competitive strength in model sports league).
37. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 34, at 596; see also Quirk & El Hodiri, supra note
36, at 41-45 (noting many implicit assumptions in this model); L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
AND THE LAW 224-29 (1977) (discussing interview with NFL Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, appearing in PLAYBOY, Oct. 1973, at 78).
38. See, e.g., United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953) ("Professional teams
in a league, however, must not compete too well with each other in a business way."); J. WEISTART
& C. LOWELL, supra note 34, at 597 (same).
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In a series of player restraint cases in the 1970s, courts reached differing conclusions on the application of the rule of reason or the per se
rule within the context of professional sports. Several trial courts recognized that the challenged restraints had characteristics in common with
group boycotts, horizontal market divisions, and price fixing arrangements, arrangements that normally warrant application of the per se
rule. 39 Some courts equivocated, however, because of their lack of experience with sports industry restraints; these courts also examined the factual basis of the arrangements under the rule of reason. 40 In Mackey v.
NFL, the most widely cited of the early player restraint cases, the Eighth
Circuit rejected the district court's application of the per se rule, emphasizing the unique nature of the professional sports industry. 41 Application of the rule of reason, however, failed to legitimize the challenged
restraints in Mackey or in any of the other cases in which courts applied
the rule of reason: the player restraints were uniformly condemned as
42
unreasonable.
Currently, the NFLPA challenges the right of first refusal/compensation system contained in the 1982 collective bargaining agreement as
well as the modified free agency system unilaterally implemented by the
NFLMC on February 1, 1989. Under the right of first refusal/compensation system contained in the 1982 agreement, a team retained certain
43
rights to a player after its contractual rights to that player expired.
When a player's contractual relationship with his team ended, the player
was permitted to accept an offer from another team. The player's original team, however, had the right either to match the offer and retain the
player or to receive draft choice compensation from the other team. The
compensation, which was based on the new team's offer and the number
of years the player had been in the League, raised the price to the new
team of obtaining a particular player's services to a level that completely
39. See, eg., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.D.C. 1976) (analogizing the
draft to a "group boycott in its classic and most pernicious form"), aff'd in part and rey'd in part,
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975) (finding
Rozelle Rule and related practices were a concerted refusal to deal and a group boycott), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v. NFL,
390 F. Supp. 73, 81 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (noting that players who violate their contracts will be "boycotted by all members clubs").
40. Eg., Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 745-46 (finding activities would be barred even under rule of
reason); Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 81-82 (noting rule of reason may be more appropriate, given unique
nature of sports league activities).
41. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619-20.
42. See, eg., Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188-89 (1968 NFL draft had "severe anti-competitive effects
and no demonstrated pro-competitive virtues"); Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622 (Rozelle Rule is "significantly more restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes").
43. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XV.
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deterred the movement of players under this system. 44
The NFLPA's objective as it approached the bargaining table in
1987 was to eliminate the compensation restrictions contained in the
1982 agreement in order to provide veteran players, upon expiration of
their individual player contracts, with a realistic opportunity to change
teams.45 Negotiations with the NFLMC for a new agreement were unsuccessful, however, and the League maintained the right of first refusal/
compensation provisons contained in the 1982 agreement during the
1987 and 1988 seasons. Late in 1988, the NFLMC proposed and the
NFLPA rejected a modified system of free agency. 4 6 On February 1,
1989, the NFLMC unilaterally implemented the new system, Plan B.
Under that system, each team is permitted to protect thirty-seven players. 47 The new system subjects the thirty-seven protected players on each
team to a right of first refusal/compensation system similar to the system
contained in the 1982 agreement. The new system, however, changes the
levels of compensation required under the 1982 agreement and, in addition, specifies three different compensation requirements depending upon
the performance during the prior season of the team signing the free
agent.4 8 Thus, the nine weakest teams are subjected to somewhat lower
compensation requirements than the middle nine teams and the top ten
teams. Like the system contained in the 1982 agreement, teams are permitted to sign protected free agents between February 1 and April 1 of
the year following the free agent's final season under contract with his
team. Not a single player changed teams under this system between Feb49
ruary 1, 1989 and April 1, 1989.
Under the new system, players unprotected by their teams become
unrestricted free agents on February 1, regardless of whether the player
is under contract for the upcoming season as of that date or is a free
agent. 50 Unprotected players are also free to sign a contract with a new
team between February 1 and April 1. The new team is not required to
compensate the unprotected player's former team. The rights of unpro44. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 779-81 (D. Minn. 1988). In fact, the court noted that of
the 1,415 players who became veteran free agents during the term of the 1982 agreement, apparently
only one player even received an offer from another club. Id. at 781 & n.6. That player, Brent Boyd
of Minnesota, received an offer from the San Diego Chargers in 1983. The offer, which Minnesota
chose to match, was not high enough to trigger draft choice compensation.
45. Id. at 781.
46. See Letter from Gene Upshaw, Executive Director of NFLPA, to Jack Donlan, Executive
Director of NFL Management Council (Dec. 12, 1988) (rejecting NFLMC proposals and presenting
NFLPA's proposal on free agency).
47. See Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 13, 1989, at 7.
48. See Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779-81.
49. King, Inside the NFL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 18, 1989, at 68.
50. See id.; see also Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779-81.
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tected players who do not sign a contract with a new team by April 1
51
revert back to the team that failed to protect the player.
Two hundred and twenty-nine unprotected players changed teams

between February 1, 1989 and April 1, 1989.52 A large majority of these
players, however, were either aging veterans with large contracts, players
recovering from serious injuries, or marginal players.5 3 The top thirtyseven players on each team are still subjected to a right of first refusual/
compensation system similar to the one contained in the 1982 agreement

and, accordingly, the NFLPA has indicated it will challenge the new
system.

54

The right of first refusal/compensation system contained in the 1982
collective bargaining agreement as well as the system unilaterally implemented by the owners on February 1, 1989, are similar to restraints condemned in prior actions. These systems are modified versions of the
NFL's old "Rozelle Rule," which gave the commissioner discretionary
power to award compensation to a team losing a free agent if the free
agent's new and old teams could not agree on compensation. 55 The Rozelle Rule was abolished after Mackey v. NFL, when the Eighth Circuit
held that under section 1 of the Sherman Act the rule constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade. 56 The 1982 version of the right of first
refusal/compensation system eliminated the commissioner discretion element of the Rozelle Rule; otherwise, it is functionally identical to the
Rozelle Rule. In practice, it proved even more restrictive as fewer play57
ers have moved under the 1982 system.
51. See Scorecard,supra note 47, at 7.
52. See King, supra note 49, at 68.
53. See generally id. ("Of the 229 players who switched clubs under the system, 105 (46%)
made opening-day rosters. Of these, 33 (14% of the total) started in Week I .... ). But see id.
(Cleveland Browns official crediting Plan B system with enabling team to fill key positions).
54. Id. (" 'It wasn't lawful and wasn't adequate for all players in 1989, and it won't be lawful
or adequate in 1990,' says Doug Allen, the union's assistant executive director.").
55. The League unilaterally implemented the Rozelle Rule in 1963, five years before the NLRB
recognized the NFLPA as the exclusive bargaining representative for NFL players. Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
56. Id. at 622.
57. In 1977, the NFL and the NFLPA executed a five-year collective bargaining agreement in
which the right of first refusal/compensation system replaced the Rozelle Rule as the mechanism for
limiting the movement of players. The new system included pre-determined, objective compensation
criteria, thereby eliminating the commissioner's involvement in the process of compensating teams
losing free agents. See 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football
League Players Association and the National Football League Management Council art. XV (Mar.
1, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement]. The 1977 collective bargaining agreement was incorporated in a judicially approved settlement of the class action. Alexander v. NFL,
1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) S 61,730, at 72,985-86 (D. Minn. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Reynolds v. NFL,
584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978). NFL players brought suit in Alexander after the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Mackey that the Rozelle Rule violated the Sherman Act. The settlement agreement pro-
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Similarly, the League's new system, based on the results in 1989,
appears to be as restrictive as the old system, at least with respect to the
top thirty-seven players on each team's roster. Not a single protected
player changed teams under the new system. Admittedly, a significant
number of unprotected players moved. Yet the employee turnover rate
in the NFL is approximately 25% and, consequently, many unprotected
players are in jeopardy of losing their job to a rookie selected in the 1989
draft.
Based on previous judicial pronouncements condemning player restraints, the current suit is, on the merits, likely to be resolved in favor of
the players' association. Prior courts, analyzing similar restraints under
the rule of reason, have recognized the League's justifications for the restraints but concluded nevertheless that those justifications did not re58
quire the restraints to be completely insulated from the antitrust laws.
Moreover, the courts concluded that the League had implemented excesvided, interalia, that the League would pay more than $13 million over the period from 1977-1987
as damages to class members who played in the NFL from 1972-1976. Id. at 281-82.
During the five-year life of the 1977 agreement, only one player shifted teams in a transaction
involving draft choice compensation. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D. Minn. 1988). Of
approximately 600 players who became free agents between 1977 and 1982, fewer than 50 received
offers from other teams pursuant to article XV of the 1977 Agreement. Id. Only two of those
players received offers high enough to trigger compensation if their original club chose not to match
the offer. The one player who did move was Norm Thompson, who moved in 1977 from St. Louis to
Baltimore in return for a third round draft choice. The other player, Randey Crowder, received an
offer from the Atlanta Falcons in 1977 which would have required a third round draft choice as
compensation. The Miami Dolphins, Crowder's original team, chose to match the offer and
Crowder remained with Miami. See Affidavit of Richard A. Berthelsen, NFLPA General Counsel,
at 13-14, Powell, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988) (No. 4-87-917) [hereinafter Berthelsen Affidavit].
In 1982, the parties executed a new five-year collective bargaining agreement. The new agreement contained a modified right of first refusal/compensation system, which increased the salary
levels triggering draft choice compensation. For example, the salary level triggering a third-round
draft choice for a veteran free agent entering his fourth NFL season increased from $55,000 in 1981
(1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra, art. XV) to $90,000 in 1983 (1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XV). Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 780-81. The liberalized system,
however, failed to increase player movement. Upward pressure on salaries due to competition for
players from the United States Football League negated the modifications in the 1982 agreement.
Not a single player changed teams under this system until 1988, after the 1982 agreement had expired, when Chicago Bears linebacker Wilbur Marshall received an offer from the Washington Redskins which the Bears chose not to match. Marshall signed with the Redskins, and the Bears
received Washington's first round draft choices in 1988 and 1989 as compensation. See Berthelsen
Affidavit, supra, at 13-14; see also supra note 44 (discussing free agent movement under the 1982
agreement).
58. See, eg., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[A] player
draft can survive scrutiny under the Rule of reason only if it is demonstrated to have positive,
economicallyprocompetitive benefits that offset its anticompetitive effects, or ... if it is demonstrated
to accomplish legitimate business purposes and to have a net anticompetitive effect that is insubstantive. "); Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621-22 (Rozelle Rule found invalid under the rule of reason because it
applied to every play regardless of status, was unlimited in duration, and lacked procedural
safeguards).
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sive restraints and that less restrictive alternatives would accomplish the
same objectives.5 9 The currently challenged restraints likely face this
same conclusion.
One factor, however, distinguishes the current NFL dispute from
the previous antitrust attacks on player restraints: the NFLPA is no
longer in its infancy. In each of the earlier cases, the challenged restraints were unilaterally implemented by the League prior to the formation of the players' association. 60 The restraints were initially
incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement while the union was in
61
its infancy and too weak to resist management's demands.
In the earlier cases, NFL management argued that because the challenged restraints were incorporated in an existing collective bargaining
agreement, they were immunized from antitrust attack by virtue of the
nonstatutory labor exemption. 62 However, the courts uniformly rejected
this argument. The courts found the challenged restraints, although contained in an agreement, reflected the weak position of the union and were
63
not the product of meaningful, arm's-length negotiations.
In the current case, NFL Management is again arguing that the labor exemption immunizes the challenged restraints from antitrust attack. 64 Clearly, the union is no longer in its infancy and, therefore, a
court is less likely to conclude that the restraints incorporated in the
most recent agreement were not the product of arm's-length negotiations. Nonetheless, the labor exemption once again is the pivotal issue in
the NFL dispute because the challenged restraints are contained in an
expired collective bargaining agreement. Before addressing the merits of
the players' antitrust claims, therefore, the court must determine the
scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption. More specifically, the court
must determine the extent to which the nonstatutory labor exemption
59. See, ag., Smith, 593 F.2d at 1187-88 (draft rule's purpose of promoting athletic competitiveness among teams might be accomplished through restricting number of players any team allowed to sign, allowing draft prospect to negotiate with other teams should drafting team fail to
make an acceptable offer, conducting second draft, or restricting draft to top players and allowing

others to enter "free market").
60. For example, the NFL instituted the draft in 1935. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1174. The League
unilaterally implemented the Rozelle Rule in 1963, five years before the NLRB recognized the
NFLPA as the exclusive bargaining representative for NFL players. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610-11.
61. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
62. See, eg., id. at 612 (defendants argued that Rozelle Rule was incorporated into agreement
with players union and that the agreement should be insulated from antitrust liability to achieve
"proper accommodation of federal labor and antitrust policies"); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp 73, 84

(N.D. Cal. 1974).
63. See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616 (no arm's-length bargaining found with recent Rozelle
Rule).
64. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 782-83 (D. Minn. 1988).
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immunizes from antitrust attack restraints contained in a collective bargaining agreement that has expired.
B.

The Labor Exemption

The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, has as its primary purpose to
regulate commercial activity. 65 Nonetheless, early courts interpreted the
general language of the Act to apply not only to commercial activity, but
also to combinations among employees that interrupted the free flow of
66
commercial activity.
Unions by nature are combinations that attempt to restrain an employer's ability to deal with employees. In addition, most types of concerted union activity, such as strikes and boycotts, restrain the movement
of an employer's goods. Thus, application of the Sherman Act to labor
combinations impeded the development of unions. As a result, Congress
included two provisions in the 1914 Clayton Act to reduce the impact of
the antitrust laws on the labor movement. 67 Section 6 of the Clayton Act
68
provides that labor unions are not combinations in restraint of trade.
Section 20 restricts the injunctive power of courts in labor disputes to
certain enumerated types of union organizational activities. 69 However,
the Supreme Court interpreted section 20 narrowly and many union activities were, after 1914, still subject to antitrust attack and the injunctive
power of the courts. 70 The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 7 1 approved in 1932,
expanded the protection given to union activity by further restricting the
use of injunctions in labor disputes. 72 Together, the relevant Clayton Act
and Norris-LaGuardia Act provisions constitute the statutory labor exemption. This exemption protects unions and certain types of union ac73
tivity from antitrust liability.
The statutory labor exemption does not immunize from antitrust at65. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1945).
66. R. GORMAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAW 3 (1976).
67. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
70. See, e.g, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 471-74 (1921) (secondary
boycott not immunized from antitrust attack because defendant employees lack direct employment
relationship with company which was ultimate object of boycott).
71. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70, 71-73 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 and 113 (1982)).
72. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22
(1975) (statutory enactments exempt specific union activities from operation of antitrust laws).
73. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501-03 (1940) (federal labor policy
codified in statutory exemption immunizes inherently anticompetitive collective activities by
employees).
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tack agreements between labor and management. 74 The courts, though,
have recognized that the application of antitrust laws to labor-management agreements would undermine the collective bargaining process
mandated by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Thus, courts have created a common law, nonstatutory exemption to im75
munize labor-management agreements.
The scope of this nonstatutory labor exemption is not precisely defined. 76 The Supreme Court decisions indicate that a collective bargaining agreement, to be eligible for antitrust immunity, must meet certain
minimum prerequisites. For example, the agreement must not include
outside parties. 7 7 Similarly, matters in the agreement that affect other
employers or employment relationships are not immunized; the exemption is limited to matters that primarily affect the immediate employment
relationship. 78 Beyond these threshold requirements, however, the Court
has not articulated a general standard for applying the labor exemption
to union-employer agreements.
More specifically, the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
whether the labor exemption immunizes provisions in an expired agreement. Furthermore, the Court's prior decisions addressing the labor exemption do not provide any clear guidelines with which to resolve this
question within the context of professional sports. In rendering its earlier decisions, the Court faced and responded to the question of whether
the labor exemption would immunize certain union-proposed restraints.
In those cases, the union asserted the labor exemption to escape antitrust
liability. The plaintiff was either the employer or a third party challeng79
ing a union-proposed restraint embodied in an unexpired agreement.
In the current NFL dispute, as well as in each of the other player restraint cases in which the application of the labor exemption was at issue,
the union is the plaintiff, and the League has raised the exemption to
74.
Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987) (citing United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)).
75.
eg.,
421 U.S. at 621-22 ("The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the
strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and
working conditions"); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) ("exemption for union-employer agreements is very much a matter bf accommodating the coverage of
the Sherman Act to the policy of the labor laws").
76.
J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
note 34, at 525.
77.
421 U.S. at 622-23.

78.

381 U.S. at 664-66 (union forfeits exemption when it is "clearly shown"

that it agreed with employer to impose certain wage scale on other bargaining units).
79.
J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
note 34, at 526 (citing
421 U.S. 616
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
381 U.S. 676
(1965).
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immunize its own proposed restraints.80
This distinction is significant in light of the original purpose of the
labor exemption. Congress created the statutory labor exemption to protect unions and their legitimate organizing activities from antitrust attack.8 1 The purpose of the nonstatutory labor exemption, which is
derived from the statutory exemption, is to effectuate Congress' limited
objective as expressed in the statutory exemption. 82 To protect the

union's role in collective bargaining, both parties to the agreement must
be protected from antitrust liability. As a result, the nonstatutory exemption affords employers derivative protection from the antitrust
laws. 83 Nevertheless, the original purpose of the exemption-to benefit
labor-endures and has undoubtedly influenced the Court's decisions.

The prior player restraint cases are also of limited precedential value
in the current dispute. The willingness of courts to recognize the union's

infancy as a factor in determining the scope of the labor exemption factually distinguishes the current dispute from the earliest player restraint
cases. More important, no previous court has addressed the legal effect
of an expired agreement.8 4 In each of the earlier player restraint cases, of
course, the court addressed the same general policy choice raised in the

current dispute: whether federal labor policy encouraging collective bargaining overrides the federal antitrust policy prohibiting unreasonable re-

straints of trade. The focus of the current dispute, however, is more
specific: whether the federal labor policy encouraging collective bargain-

ing compels courts to exempt restraints contained in an expired agree85
ment. This specific policy choice is not addressed in the prior cases.

80. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (challenge by NBPA).
81. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 700-13; Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 801-08 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229-37 (1941).
82. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
83. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 34, at 527.
84. In Mackey, the only challenge to restraints in an expired agreement, the court withheld the
exemption because of the absence of bona-fide, arm's-length negotiations. 543 F.2d at 615-16. The
court specifically noted that its decision did not reach the question whether the exemption survived
the expiration of the agreement. Id. at 616 n.18.
85. Mackey, however, does offer some guidance. The Mackey court held that the labor exemption immunizes player restraints provided those restraints are the product of bona-fide, arm's-]ength
negotiations. See supra note 84. In other words, union approval seems to be a prerequisite to the
application of the exemption; the mere potential for bargaining is not enough to immunize the restraints, and the exemption will not immunize restraints unilaterally implemented by management.
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III. THE CURRENT NFL DISPUTE
A.

The Unique Nature of the Employment Relationship in the
ProfessionalSports Industry

The history of collective bargaining in the NFL is, to a large extent,
a function of the unique nature of the employment relationship in the
professional sports industry. Several factors distinguish the market for
professional football from other markets, and professional athletes and
team owners from industrial unions and more typical multi-employer
bargaining units. These factors, discussed below, have created an inherently unequal bargaining relationship between players and owners quite
unlike the relationship between industrial employees and employers.
The NFLPA is, as a bargaining unit, inherently weaker than industrial bargaining units. The players' association consists of a total of
about 1500 players on twenty-eight teams located in twenty-six different
cities. Unlike industrial employees, professional athletes do not possess
homogeneous skills; a wide range of ability and expertise exists among
players. Not surprisingly, different union demands affect superstars and
marginal players differently. For example, marginal players would undoubtedly benefit from higher minimum salaries and greater job security,
while star players would realize greater benefits from free agency. Because of the lack of commonality of interests among players, the NFLPA
lacks the cohesiveness enjoyed by industrial unions.
Other factors distinguish the players' association from industrial unions. Because of the collective nature of athletic contests, players associations recognize that a player's value to any particular team depends
not only on the player's skill level, but also on the nature of the player's
skills and the player's attitude, conduct, age, and relationship with teammates. As a consequence, the employment relationship in professional
sports presumes that teams retain the discretion to make necessary personnel changes in search of the right combination of talent, attitude, and
86
leadership to produce a winning team.
As a result of this unique employment relationship, individual players, with the exception of a few superstars, have virtually no job security.
The NFL standard player contract contains no injury protection beyond
86. See, ag., NFL Player Contract V 1I (rev. 1982):
SKILL, PERFORMANCE, AND CONDUCT. Player understands that he is competing with
other players for a position on Club's roster within the applicable player limits. If at any
time, in the sole judgment of Club, Player's skill or performance has been unsatisfactory as
compared with that of other players competing for positions on Club's roster, or if Player
has engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by Club to adversely affect or reflect on
Club, the Club may terminate this contract.
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the season in which an injury occurs87 and grants the team sole discre-

88
tion to terminate the player's contract at any time for lack of skill.

Fewer than 5% of all NFL players are able to negotiate skill and/or
injury guarantees into their standard contract.8 9 The 1982 collective bargaining agreement contained only minimal protection against injury90

and lack of skill 91 beyond that contained in the standard contract. Career-ending injuries as well as injuries that reduce a player's skill are not
uncommon. Teams constantly attempt to upgrade the quality of their
rosters and, as a result, there is a continuous turnover of employees. Not
surprisingly, the average career for an NFL player is less than 4 years.92

The lack of job security and brief work-life of most players distinguishes the NFLPA from most industrial unions and creates problems
for the association not encountered by other unions. Because of the brief
work-life of its bargaining unit employees, the union has an extremely
short institutional memory. The NFLPA experiences approximately
twenty-five percent yearly turnover in its bargaining unit, a rate unheard
of in industrial unions. 93 At any given time, many if not most players

would not have been members of the NFLPA during the negotiations for
the previous collective bargaining agreement. As the union approaches
negotiations for a new agreement, it must educate a large number of employees who have absolutely no understanding of the nature of labormanagement relations in the industry. Moreover, the brief work-life
guarantees that few players will remain in the League long enough to
87. Id. 9.
INJURY. If Player is injured in the performance of his services under this contract and
promptly reports such injury to the Club physician or trainer, then Player will receive such
medical and hospital care during the term of this contract as the Club physician may deem
necessary, and, in accordance with Club's practice, will continue to receive his yearly salary for so long, during the season of injury only and for no subsequent period, as Player is
physically unable to perform the services required of him by this contract because of such
injury. If Player's injury in the performance of his services under this contract results in
his death the unpaid balance of his yearly salary for the season of injury will be paid to his
stated beneficiary or, in the absence of a stated beneficiary, his estate.
88. Id. 11; see also supra note 86. The club's discretion to terminate is limited by a good faith
requirement, "meaning that the decision to terminate must be made honestly and without pretense."
J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 34, at 232.
89. NFLPA, GAME PLAN '87, at 14 (1986).
90. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. X (qualifying player receives 50%
of salary up to maximum of $65,000 for season following injury season, unless individual contract
contains greater injury protection; only entitled to injury benefit once in career).
91. Id. art. XXXV (provides for termination pay for players with at least four years of NFL
service in amount equal to unpaid balance of initial 50% of salary, exclusive of deferred compensation, but not less than equivalent of one week's salary).
92. The NFLPA research department reports that the average NFL career is less than 4 years.
See NFLPA, GAME PLAN '87, at 23 (1986).
93. See Serrin, Behind the FootballStrike: New Questionsfor Labor, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,
1982, at 1, 34, col. 5 (football players' union has annual turnover rate of 25%).
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benefit from the elimination of certain restraints. In effect, the union
must ask players to strike, play without an agreement, or forgo immedi-

ate gains at the bargaining table for the benefit of future players.
The lack of job security creates even more significant problems as
the NFLPA seeks to bargain for its highly vulnerable members. NFL

players possess highly specialized skills that are rarely marketable in any
other industry either during or after their NFL careers. The NFL is the
only buyer of the skills possessed by its employees. 94 In the overwhelming majority of situations, a player who is cut will experience an enormous drop in yearly income. In the most extreme case, a player with a
six figure income will be unable to find employment outside of profes-

sional football. As a result, individual players are extremely vulnerable
to management pressure. Within the context of collective bargaining,
player representatives and other players active in the union are particularly vulnerable. 95 Proving discriminatory discharge is extremely difficult in an industry where the employer retains sole discretion to make
96
employment decisions.

NFL owners, in contrast to the weak position of the players vis-a-vis

industrial unions, are inherently strong vis-a-vis other multi-employer
bargaining units. Professional football is currently a one league industry.
In 1966, Congress granted the NFL and the American Football League

an antitrust exemption, permitting the two leagues to merge. 97 Since that
merger, two leagues, the World Football League and more recently the
United States Football League, were unable to compete with the NFL
and were essentially driven from the market. 9 8 The NFL currently com-

petes with no other professional football league for fan interest or employees. 99 Consequently, the NFL is the only buyer of the skills
94. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing charges of discriminatory discharge by NFL teams).
96. See supra note 86 (providing text of standard player's contract).
97. The merger authorization bill became law on November 8, 1966, as part of Pub. L. No. 89800, § 6(b)(1), 80 Stat. 1508, 1515 (1966). It is now codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp,
V 1987) and reads in pertinent part:
In addition, such laws shall not apply to a joint agreement by which the member clubs of
two or more professional football leagues, which are exempt from income tax under section
501 (c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 U.S.C. 501 (c)(6)] combine their operations in expanded single league so exempt from income tax, if such agreement increases
rather than decreases the number of professional football clubs so operating, and the provisions of which are directly relevant thereto.
98. For a discussion of competing leagues, see R. BERRY, LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFEsSIONAL SPORTS 92-96 (1986).
99. The Arena Football League, formed in 1987, played two seasons. However, that league was
not really a competitor of the NFL. Its games were played indoors with eight men teams on a 50yard field. All players received the same salary. The Arena Football League will not operate in
1989. See Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 20, 1989, at 16.
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possessed by its employees.
In addition, NFL football is sufficiently distinctive so that the
League also does not compete with college football or professional

leagues in other sports. t°

No real substitutes exist for the League's

product. 0 1 Moreover, demand for NFL football is high (the league has

operated at about 90% attendance capacity over the past decade. 10 2) Demand is also inelastic (at least in response to changes in quality)-fans
attended, and the networks televised the 1987 strike games between
teams composed of players previously cut from NFL rosters. 10 3 The
League thus possesses both monopoly and monopsony power in a market

in which excess demand exists for its product.
In addition to operating in an environment in which there are no
outside competitors for fan interest or employees, the NFL has, in the
name of preserving competitive balance, successfully regulated intraleague competition for fan interest and players. Courts have accepted the
League's competitive balance argument as justification for analyzing ar1 4
guably per se violations of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason. 0
More significantly, the League, with the help of Congress, has adopted a
system of revenue sharing to govern intra-league economic competition.

In 1961, the NFL, in an effort to maximize industry revenues, approached Congress and obtained an exemption from the antitrust laws
permitting the League to sell broadcast rights to its games in a package. 0 5 Ancillary to this exemption, NFL teams share equally television
revenues from the sale of League broadcast rights. Because gate receipts
Another league, the Canadian Football League (CFL), is currently in operation but similarly is
not a realistic or serious competitor to the NFL. CFL teams are in none of the NFL markets, and
league revenues and players' salaries are a fraction of NFL revenues and salaries. With the exception of a few CFL games that appear on ESPN during non-prime time hours, the NFL and the CFL
do not compete in the market for television viewers. Finally, under league rules CFL teams are
limited in the number of American players each team is permitted to carry on its roster.
100. Cf NFL v. USFL, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding NFL had monopoly
power in market defined as professional football), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1987).
101. Cf Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1297-301 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (discussing the relevant market for college football), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.
1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). NFL football, like college football, is sufficiently distinctive to
conclude that no real substitutes exist for its product.
102. In 1984, NFL attendance was 13,398,112, or 88.4% of capacity. THE NFL AND YOU
1985-1986, at 6 (1985). In 1985, NFL attendance was 88% of capacity, and in 1986 attendance
equalled 89% of capacity. OFFICIAL 1987 NFL RECORD AND FACT BOOK (1987).
103. Demand is inelastic when it fails to respond to changes in price or quality of a product. For
a discussion of the view of the players toward the replacement games, see Garvey, Foreword to The
Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports: A Perspective on Collective Bargainingin the
NFL, 1989 DUKE L.J. 325, 331, 335.
104. See, eg., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 618-20 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. V 1987) provides:
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are divided 60%-40% between the home and visiting teams, approxi-

mately 90% of industry revenues are shared equally among the twentyeight team owners.106 Interestingly, playoff money, as well as revenues
generated by the Super Bowl, are also shared equally among the twenty-

eight teams. 107
As a result of this system of revenue sharing, a system not common
to employers in other industries, the NFLMC is inherently stronger and

more cohesive than other multi-employer bargaining units. At the bargaining table, every demand or position taken by the NFLMC affects

each of the twenty-eight owners identically, at least from an economic
standpoint. Moreover, revenue sharing removes the economic incentive
to produce a winning franchise.108 Regardless of the system regulating
the movement of free agents which the parties agree upon at the bargain-

ing table, no economic incentive exists for a given owner to bid on expensive free agents to improve the quality of his or her football team.

Bidding for an expensive free agent may help a team win more games and
most certainly will increase a team's payroll. It will not, however, necessarily increase a team's revenues.
In addition to removing the economic incentive to win, the League
historically has penalized teams for signing other teams' free agents. The

earliest mechanism for penalizing teams was the Rozelle Rule. 10 9 Following the Eighth Circuit's decision in Mackey v. NFL, the League em-

ployed a right of first refusal/compensation mechanism to restrict the
movement of free agents. Recognizing the possibility that some owners

may derive more utility from winning than from maximizing their profThe antitrust laws ... shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging
in or conducting the organized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, or
hockey, by which any league of clubs participating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such
league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs.
106. See NFLPA, GAME PLAN '87, at 28 (1986).
107. Stoltz, Who Really Makes Money in the NFL?, REGARDIE'S, Oct. 1985, at 73-82; see also
NFLPA, WHY A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS? BECAUSE WE ARE THE GAME 30 (1981) (detailing
sharing of revenues) [hereinafter WHY A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS?].
108. Stoltz, supra note 107, at 73-82; see also Boyle, The 55% Solution, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Feb. 1, 1982, at 30, 32 (quoting NFLPA Executive Director Ed Garvey's reference to NFL's system
of revenue sharing as "corporate socialism"). NFL teams divide network television revenues and
playoff money equally, see supra text accompanying notes 106-07, and gate receipts are split 60%40% between home and visiting teams, with most stadiums either sold out or near capacity. WHY A
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS?, supra note 107, at 30-31. Consequently, the addition of a superstar may
improve a team's win-loss record, but not generate significant additional revenue. From an economic standpoint, signing high-priced free agents simply increases a team's expenses. The NFLPA's
Garvey insisted that this system of revenue sharing, under which a major portion of team revenues
are essentially fixed, provided no incentive for teams to engage in bidding for expensive free agents.
See Boyle, supra, at 32.
109. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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its, the NFLMC has, until recently, refused to compromise its position
on the free agent system. 110 Presumably, the League implemented its
new "liberalized" system, which grants unrestricted free agency to only
unprotected (second tier) players, to increase the likelihood that the district court would find the system reasonable under the rule of reason."'1
The bargaining history that led to the inclusion of the right of first
refusal/compensation system in the 1982 collective bargaining agreement
and the implementation of the League's current system is discussed below. 112 Despite the negative impact that this system has had on player
salaries and player mobility, 113 the inclusion of this system in the 1982
agreement was not surprising in light of the unique nature of the employment relationship in the professional sports industry and the inherently
weak status of the union. Because of this employment relationship, management's domination over the union at the bargaining table is understandable and arguably inevitable.
B.

The BargainingHistory and Evolution of the Challenged Restraints

1. The 1977 Agreement. The NFLPA appeared to be in an extremely strong bargaining position immediately following the Eighth Circuit's 1976 decision in Mackey. During the three-year period between
the expiration of the 1970 collective bargaining agreement in 1974 and
the execution of the 1977 agreement, the players filed four antitrust suits
challenging various player restraints employed by the owners. The union
returned to the bargaining table in 1977 with judicial decisions that the
labor exemption did not apply and that each of the challenged restraints
114
violated the antitrust laws.
The union, however, was in fact struggling to survive. The litigation
during the previous four years had taken its toll both financially and organizationally. More debilitating was the ongoing labor dispute with the
NFLMC. The players played the 1974, '75 and '76 seasons with no collective bargaining agreement, while the union and the owners engaged in
110. See supra notes 46-54 (discusses hybrid free agent system unilaterally implemented by owners in Feb., 1989).
111. See Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 13, 1989, at 7-8.
112. See infra notes 114-48 and accompanying text.
113. E.g., J. WEIsTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 34, at 608-09 (discussing findings in Mackey
case).
114. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (invalidating professional
football player draft); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that Rozelle Rule
violated the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Bryant v. NFL, No. 75-2543 (C.D.
Cal. July 30, 1975) (temporary restraining order granted against Rozelle Rule); Bryant, (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 7, 1975) (order dissolved after Commissioner changed compensation from active player (Bryant) to draft choices); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (striking down option clause,
standard player contract, Rozelle Rule, and no-tampering rule).
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intermittent and bitter negotiations over the League's restrictions on free
agency. An aborted League-wide strike during the 1974 pre-season was
followed by a walk-out by isolated teams at the conclusion of pre-season
play in 1975. The failure of other teams to join the walk-out left the
115
union bitter and divided.
Meanwhile, the union filed thirty-two unfair labor practice charges
with the NLRB during this time. The Board issued a consolidated complaint and held a hearing on fifteen of the charges. The NFLPA alleged,
inter alia, that management had refused to furnish bargaining information, had attempted to change terms of employment unilaterally, and
had discharged players for union activity. 116 In fact, virtually every
union officer, as well as numerous player representatives and other players who actively and openly supported the union, was terminated or
traded during the course of negotiations.1 7 These discharges, together
with other management conduct, undoubtedly chilled union support.
By 1977, the NFLPA was experiencing serious financial problems
and a significant erosion of support from its constituents. Management
had stopped funding the players' pension, and a majority of players, convinced that the union was responsible for the inability of the parties to
reach an agreement, refused to pay union dues." 8 Under pressure from
the players to reach an agreement and in the face of management's unwillingness to consider eliminating the condemned restraints, 1 9 the
NFLPA submitted to a five-year agreement containing a union security
clause along with slightly modified versions of each of the judicially-condemned restraints.1 20 These restraints, like their predecessors, limited
players' mobility and depressed salaries.
The modifications of the Rozelle Rule in particular had virtually no
impact on player mobility or salaries. Moreover, in one of the most significant setbacks in the history of the NFLPA, the NFLMC won the
115. For a brief history of events during this time period, see L. SOBEL, supra note 37, at 278-87;
R. BERRY, supra note 98, at 126.
116. NFLMC and NFL Clubs and NFLPA, NLRB Case No. 2-CA-13379, June 30, 1976.
117. See id. at 55-64 (termination of NFLPA officers); L. SOBEL, supra note 37, at 285-86 (players active in union terminated during negotiations). It should be noted that other players may have
been released during this period on account of their union activity. Because teams retain the unilateral right to make roster decisions, see supranote 86, discriminatory discharge is extremely difficult
to establish within the context of professional sports. As a result, many other players, conceivably
released for union activity during this time period, never filed unfair labor practice charges with the
Board.
118. Garvey, supra note 103, at 334.
119. See generally L. SOBEL, supra note 37, at 278-87 (history of player actions during this time
period).
120. 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement between NFLMC and NFLPA, arts. IV, § 1, XII,
XV (Mar. 1, 1977) (union security clause, NFL standard player contract, college draft, and right of
first refusal/compensation, respectively) [hereinafter 1977 NFL Agreement].
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infamous "section 17 dispute" at arbitration, giving individual teams perpetual rights to players under contract.1 2 1 As a result of the section 17
decision and the right of first refusal/compensation system contained in
the 1977 collective bargaining agreement, only one player changed teams
under the modified system between 1977 and 1982.122 When the players
approached the bargaining table in 1982, they were, at least with respect
to the restrictions on the movement of veteran free agents, in virtually

the same position as they had been when preparing for negotiations in
1974.
2. The Union's "Percentageof Gross" Plan. The 1977 agreement
expired on July 15, 1982.123 Prior to negotiations for a new agreement,
the NFLPA concluded that the system of individual salary negotiations,
along with the right of first refusal/compensation provisions, had failed

to provide adequate compensation for players. 124 Moreover, the union
concluded that players would never obtain an equitable share of League
revenues through individual salary negotiations, regardless of modifica-

tions of the right of first refusal/compensation provisions in the 1977
agreement. The League's system of revenue sharing simply eliminated

any economic incentive for teams to bid on individual players.12 5
121. Section 17 of article XV of the 1977 NFL Agreement provided that teams could retain the
exclusive rights to a veteran free agent player who had not received an offer from another team
merely by offering to re-sign that player at a salary equal to 110% of his previous year's salary. Id.
art. XV, § 17. Arbitrator Dutton interpreted section 17 as granting teams the perpetual rights to resign veteran free agents at 110% of their prior salary. In effect, Dutton held that if teams failed to
bid on each other's free agent players, teams could retain their own players indefinitely by paying
them a 10% yearly salary increase. This interpretation created a perpetual reserve system.
122. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D. Minn. 1988). That player was Norm Thompson,
who moved from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Baltimore Colts. See supra note 57.
123. 1977 NFL Agreement, supra note 120, art. XXXVI, § 2.
124. Affidavit of Richard A. Berthelsen at 19-20, submitted to the NLRB in support of Case No.
2-CCA-18923 (July 19, 1982) [hereinafter Berthelsen Affidavit II]. The reasons for the NFLPA's
dissatisfaction with the system of individual salary negotiations are discussed in WHY A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS?, supra note 107. According to the NFLPA, League revenues in 1980 were approximately $400,680,000. Id. at 8. League revenues in 1982 were predicted to increase significantly
because of a new, five-year network television contract, which guaranteed each team approximately
$14,000,000 per year. Id. at 16. The previous network contract had guaranteed each team approximately $6,000,000 per year. Id. at 11. The NFLPA predicted that the NFL would realize an even
greater increase in revenues in the future from cable and pay television contracts. Id. at 16.
Despite this growth in League revenues, the percentage of gross revenues actually received by
players had been declining steadily since 1967. In 1967, the NFLPA reported that the players received 67% of gross revenues. After the merger of the American Football League and the NFL, that
percentage decreased to approximately 42% in 1972 and approximately 30% in 1980. Id. at 36.
With the increase of League revenues from the 1982 network television contract, the union predicted
that the players' percentage of gross would drop to approximately 20% in 1982 under the system of
individual salary negotiations authorized by the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement. Id. at 47.
125. See Boyle, supra note 108, at 32 (owners have no economic incentive to sign free agents or
pay established players more money); see also supra note 108.
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In response to the NFLMC's position, the union adopted, as an alternative, a proposal guaranteeing the players a fixed percentage of
League revenues. 126 NFLPA leaders proposed a wage scale under which
revenues would be distributed to players on the basis of seniority and
objective performance criteria. 127 The union adopted this "percentage of
gross" proposal as its primary bargaining demand. 128 The owners, unalterably opposed to the percentage of gross plan, insisted upon a continuation of the system of individual player-team negotiations. 129
The negotiations between the NFLPA and the NFLMC were tense
and unproductive, leading to a fifty-five day regular season strike.130 The
union filed eleven unfair labor practice charges during the negotiations.
These charges generally involved management's bargaining tactics; in
this respect, they were indistinguishable from the charges filed against
employers in other industries or those filed against the NFLMC during
the 1974-1977 negotiations.' 3 ' Two of the charges filed by the union,
however, are particularly relevant to the owners' perpetuation of the
right of first refusal/compensation restraints challenged in the current
dispute.
3. The NFLPA's Refusal to Bargain Charges. On July 8, 1982,
the NFLPA filed the first of two refusal-to-bargain charges against man126. Berthelsen Affidavit II, supra note 124, at 1-2; see also WHY A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS?,
supra note 107, at 5. The NFLPA's initial demand was for 55% of League revenues. Id. at 35. The
union did, however, indicate in another handout distributed to the players that the percentage figure

was negotiable. NFLPA, PERCENTAGE OF GROSS: How IT WILL WORK 1 (1981) [hereinafter
How IT WILL WORK].
127. WHY A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS?, supra note 107, at 48-50. Under the proposal, the NFL
was to contribute a specific percentage of League revenues each month to a League-wide "NFL
Players' Compensation Fund." The largest percentage of this fund was to be distributed to players
through a wage scale based on seniority. Each player would receive a base salary calculated solely
on his years of service in the League. How IT WILL WORK, supra note 126, at 2-3, 9.
128. Berthelsen Affidavit II, supra note 124, at 1-2. The players endorsed the proposal at the
March 1982 NFLPA convention. How IT WILL WORK, supra note 126, at 2; see also WHY A
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS?, supra note 107, at 3.

129. Berthelsen Affidavit II, supra note 124, at 15. For example, Jack Donlan, executive director for the NFL Management Council, referring to the percentage of gross demand, stated that "[the
demand] is totally unacceptable to the owners, without regard to what the percentage is. You really
equate a percentage with control, and when you get a percentage of anything you want to change
things. The owners are not going to let the union run their business." Boyle, supra note 108, at 36.
130. For a detailed history of the 1982 negotiations between the NFLMC and NFLPA, see
Lock, Section 106F) of the NationalLaborRelationsAct and the 1982 NationalFootballLeague Players Strike, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 [hereinafter Section 100")], and Lock, Employer Unfair Labor
PracticesDuring the 1982 NationalFootballLeague Strike: Help on the Way, 6 U. BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 189 (1985) [hereinafter Employer UnfairLabor Practices].
131. See Lock, Employer Unfair Labor Practices,supra note 130, at 226 Appendix A (listing
unfair labor practice charges).
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agement stemming from the 1982 negotiations.13 2 This charge contained
eight allegations relating to management's conduct and was typical of
most refusal-to-bargain charges. In connection with the -charge, however, the union requested an injunction under section 10(j) of the NLRA
to compel the owners to bargain in good faith and, in addition, hoped to
obtain an order declaring the exclusive fights provisions in the individual
player contracts voidable. 133 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the standard NFL
player contract, the exclusive rights provisions, prohibit players from
participating in non-League sponsored football-related activities.' 3 4 The
enforceability of these provisions became the most critical issue during
the 1982 negotiations.
Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 of the standard player contract, the NFLPA planned a series of non-League-sponsored all-star
games to generate income for the players during the strike. 13 5 Prior to
the first scheduled all-star game, individual teams sent letters to their
players threatening legal action against those participating in any of the
games.' 36 While the NLRB was considering the July 9 refusal-to-bargain
charge and the related requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, the
union waged a little publicized, but highly significant, battle in the District of Columbia District Court and the Court of Appeals. This battle
132. NLRB Case No. 2-CA-18923.
133. See Lock, Section 10("), supra note 130, at 121. Section 10() of the NLRA authorizes the
NLRB to seek injunctive relief in situations in which it issues an unfair labor practice complaint. 29
U.S.C. § 1600) (1982). The NFLPA repeatedly asked the NLRB General Counsel to seek section
10(j) relief. Telephone interview with Tim English, NFLPA staff attorney and former NLRB staff
attorney (Sept. 10, 1983).
134. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the NFL Player Contract (rev. 1982) provide:
2. EMPLOYMENT AND SERVICES. Club employs Player as a skilled football player.
Player accepts such employment. He agrees to give his best efforts and loyalty to the Club,
and to conduct himself on and off the field with appropriate recognition of fact that the
success of professional football depends largely on public respect for and approval of those
associated with the game. Player will report promptly for and participate fully in Club's
official pre-season training camp, all Club meeting and practice sessions, and all pre-season,
regular-season and post-season football games scheduled for and by Club. If invited,
player will practice for and play in any all-star football game sponsored by the League.
Player will not participate in any football game not sponsored by the League.
3. OTHER ACTIVrriES. Without prior written consent of Club, Player will not play
football or engage in activities related to football otherwise than for Club or engage in any
activity other than football which may involve significant risk of personal injury. Player
represents that he has special, exceptional and unique knowledge, skill, ability, and experience as a football player, the loss of which cannot be estimated with any certainty and
cannot be fairly or adequately compensated by damages. Player, therefore, agrees that Club
will have the right, in addition to any other right which Club may possess, to enjoin Player
by appropriate proceedings from playing football or engaging in football-related activities
other than for Club or from engaging in any activity other than football which may involve
a significant risk of personal injury.
135. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8-9,
NFLPA v. NFL, No. 82-2728 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1982).
136. Telephone interview with Tim English, NFLPA staff attorney and former NLRB staff attorney (Sept. 10, 1983).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1989:339

concerned the players' right to participate in the all-star games and thus
earn a living during the strike. As much as any other single factor, this
legal battle determined the outcome of the 1982 negotiations and the substantive terms of the 1982 agreement.
The NFLPA petitioned the district court to declare the exclusive
rights provisions of the standard player contract unenforceable during
the period in which no collective bargaining agreement was in effect or
during the pendency of the strike. 137 Anticipating a rash of lawsuits in
state courts by individual teams, the NFLPA also asked the court to
enjoin individual teams from proceeding in state courts to prevent
NFLPA members from participating in the union-sponsored all-star
games. 138 The union had neither the resources nor the time to litigate
each potential challenge and realized that such a strategy by the owners
39
would effectively prevent the all-star games from being played.
On October 6, 1982, the district court denied the NFLPA's motion
for declaratory judgment on the enforceability of the exclusive rights provisions.' 40 The court stated that outstanding issues of fact prevented a
preliminary decision on the merits of the case. The court did, however,
enjoin the owners from pursuing actions in other courts. 14 The NFLPA
would suffer irreparable harm if forced to defend multiple actions, the
court reasoned, and the League would not, according to the court, be
prejudiced by being required to present its arguments in one court.
The union, encouraged by the district court's order, proceeded with
its plans for the games. Two all-star games were played, the first on
October 17, in Washington D.C., 142 and the second in Los Angeles on
October 18, 1982.143 The games proved that the union could promote its
own contests. For a brief period, the balance of power appeared to shift
dramatically.
137. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, NFLPA v. NFL, No. 82-2728
(D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1982).
138. See NFLPA v. NFL, No. 82-2728, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1982).
139. Telephone interview with Tim English, NFLPA staff attorney and former NLRB staff attorney (Sept. 10, 1983).
140. See NFLPA v. NFL, No. 82-2728, slip op. at 3-4 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1982).
141. Id. The order acknowledged that federal courts are ordinarily reluctant to enjoin future

state proceedings where such action interferes with state sovereignty. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that state interests were minimally involved, because its decision was intended to protect the
federally created right to strike. Id. The court added that the interests of efficiency, uniformity, and
most importantly, equity supported an order requiring that the dispute be decided in one forum. Id.
142. Attner, Close Friends, Few Others See Mosley Win Game in RFK, Wash. Post, Oct. 18,
1982, § D, at 1, col. 2.
143. Greenberg, Only the Lonely Were at Coliseum: Some 3,000 Gather to See AFC Beat the
NFC, 31-27, L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1982, § III, at 2, col. 1.
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The players' optimism, though, was short lived. The League immediately appealed and, prior to the third scheduled all-star game, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's order without issuing a written opinion. 144 No
additional games were played.
The NFLPA's overtures to the NLRB also were unsuccessful. On
October 29, 1982, five weeks into the strike, the NLRB finally issued a
consolidated complaint joining four unfair labor practice charges filed by
the union, including the July 9 refusal-to-bargain charge. 145 On November 11, during the eighth week of the strike, the General Counsel finally
submitted to the Board a section 10(j) request. The Board, however, decided not to seek section 100) relief. The strike ended on November 16,
the day after the Board rejected the General Counsel's request. 14 6 On
December 11, 1982, the July 9 refusal-to-bargain charge, along with
seven other charges, was withdrawn under the terms of a settlement
agreement negotiated between the NFL and NFLPA in conjunction with
the 1982 agreement.1 47
The Board's decision, coupled with the earlier ruling by the D.C.
Circuit, effectively prevented player participation in the all-star games
and severely impaired the union's bargaining position during negotiations. The "percentage of gross" proposal was rejected by management.
Moreover, the five-year agreement ultimately executed by the parties
contained the same right of first refusal/compensation system, with mi148
nor modifications, that was contained in the 1977 agreement.
4. Exclusive Representation and Individual ContractNegotiations.
One other unfair labor practice charge significantly affected the evolution
and perpetuation of the restraints challenged in the current dispute. On
September 20, 1982, the day the NFLPA executive committee voted to
strike, the NFLPA filed the second of its two refusal-to-bargain charges
against management during the 1982 negotiations. 149 This charge, unlike
the other ten charges, involved the substance of the negotiations.
144., NFL v. NFLPA, No. 82-2200 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 8, 1982) (unreported).
145." See Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing, NLRB
Cases Nos. 2-CA-18923, 2-CA-18995, 2-CA-19104, 2-CA19104-2 (Oct. 29, 1982).
146. See Lock, Section 10), supra note 130, at 138.
147. On December 11, 1982, the same day the 1982 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement was
executed, Jack Donlan and Ed Garvey signed, on behalf of the NFLMC and NFLPA, a document
entitled Settlement Agreement for the Purposes of Resolving Nine Unfair Labor Practice Charges
Filed by the NFLPA Against the NFLMC During the Negotiations.
148. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XV.
149. NLRB Case No. 2-CA-19104-2.
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The primary dispute in 1982 concerned the method by which wages
were going to be determined for a group of employees who had chosen to
be represented by an exclusive bargaining representative. 150 The owners
wanted to set wages through individual employer-employee negotiations.
The union wanted to establish a wage scale patterned after the typical
industrial model, based on seniority and objective merit criteria.151
During the negotiations for the 1982 agreement, the NFLPA informed the NFLMC that the union no longer waived its right to represent players in salary negotiations above the minimum.1 5 2 In other
words, the union rejected the extraordinary system voluntarily agreed to
54
in the past,153 in favor of the type of system prescribed by the NLRA.1
The right of first refusal/compensation system demanded by management incorporated individual player-team contract negotiations. In fact,
the League's system could not operate in the absence of direct negotiations.1 55 Thus, the owners were in effect demanding the continuation of
such negotiations.
Individual employee-employer negotiations are not prescribed by
the National Labor Relations Act. Rather, the Act mandates that every
employer has an obligation to bargain with the exclusive representative
of its employees over mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. 5 6 The
very purpose of collective bargaining is to supersede the terms of separate
agreements with individual employees in favor of terms that reflect the
group's strength and bargaining power and serve its interests. The freedom to contract individually is sacrificed for the good of the group, even
by employees who could secure better bargains for themselves than did
the union.' 57 The NFLPA alleged in the September 20 charge that the
owners' insistence on a system of individual salary negotiations constituted a refusal to bargain collectively with the union over wages and,
therefore, violated the principle of exclusive representation. 15 8
The Board included this charge in the consolidated complaint issued
150. Berthelsen Affidavit II, supra note 124, at 15.
151. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
152. Berthelsen Affidavit II, supra note 124, at 1.
153. Eg., 1977 NFL Agreement, supra note 120, art. XXII, § 8.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 157 ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ....
).
155. 1977 NFL Agreement, supra note 120, art. XV; see also infra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
156. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
157. Id.
158. NLRB Case No. 2-CA-19104-2.
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on October 29, 1982, but failed to set a hearing date. 159 Since the
NFLPA was on strike, the Board apparently preferred that the parties
devote their time and energy to resolving the underlying dispute rather
than preparing for a hearing on an isolated unfair labor practice charge.
On December 11, the charge, like the July 9 refusal-to-bargain charge,
was withdrawn under the terms of the NFLMC-NFLPA settlement
agreement. 160 The 1982 agreement authorized individual player-team
salary negotiations.161
5. Negotiationsfor the New Agreement. As it approached negotiations for a new agreement in 1987, the NFLPA decided, as it had in
1974, to seek elimination of the restrictions on free agency. 162 Management, however, refused to eliminate these restrictions. As in 1982, the
63
NFLPA struck at the conclusion of the second week of league play.1
Two weeks later, after cancelling just one week of regular season play,
the owners scheduled-and the networks televised-games between NFL
clubs composed mostly of players who had been released prior to the
start of the 1987 season. 164 By the second week of the strike, players
began to cross picket lines. Three "scab games" were played before the
strike fell apart and the players voted to return to work. 165 The NFLPA
subsequently commenced its current antitrust suit against the owners.
On December 30, 1987, a federal district court in Minnesota heard
the players' motion to preliminarily enjoin the owners from continuing to
enforce the right of first refusal/compensation provisions in the expired
1982 collective bargaining agreement. The court also heard a request by
the owners that those same provisions be declared immune from antitrust
attack. In response, the court held that the provisions were immunized
until they became an issue over which the parties bargained to impasse.' 66 A pending refusal-to-bargain charge against the union, however, prevented the court from determining at that time the presence or
159. See Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing, NLRB
Cases Nos. 2-CA-18923, 2-CA-18995, 2-CA-19104, 2-CA-19104-2 (Oct. 29, 1982).
160. See supra note 147.
161. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XXII, § 2.
162. See NFLPA, GAME PLAN '87, at 5 (1986) (NFLPA publication for its members outlining
its 1987 bargaining demands).
163. Eskeraz, Management Planning to Resume Play Using Substitutes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22,
1987, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
164. Janofsky, Sparse Crowds, Heavy Picketingat NFL Games, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1987, § 1, at
1, col. 1.
165. Janofsky, No BargainingAccord-Antitrust Suit FiledAgainst Club Owners, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
166. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 789 (D. Minn. 1988); see also infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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absence of impasse. 167
On April 28, 1988, the Board dismissed the refusal-to-bargain
charge 168 and the players renewed their motion for preliminary relief
pending resolution on the merits. On July 11, 1988, the court concluded
that the parties had reached impasse but denied the players' motion for
preliminary relief. 16 9 The district court, in response to a December 2,
1988 request by the NFLPA for a trial date, scheduled the trial on the
merits for November 13, 1989. Meanwhile, the players completed the
1988 season under the terms of the 1982 agreement.
Although the League continued to enforce the expired 1982 agreement during the 1987 and 1988 seasons and, on February 1, 1989, unilaterally implemented a modified version of the 1982 agreement,
management has revoked article IV of that agreement, the union security
clause.170 The ongoing dispute, as well as the Minnesota court's failure
to grant preliminary relief, has undoubtedly dampened the players' support for the union and. its demands. The 1987 strike, which lasted for
four weeks, cost the players approximately 25% of their 1987 salaries.
In addition, virtually all of those players who had become free agents
after the 1987 season and had waited, on the union's advice, to sign 1988
contracts until after the court's ruling on the motion for preliminary relief, lost their leverage in individual negotiations on July 11, 1988, days
before the start of training camp. Not surprisingly, a significant number
of players are not paying union dues, and the union has been forced to
secure a loan to survive the ultimate resolution of the present dispute. 171
On January 6, 1989, the district court filed a memorandum and
opinion granting a motion by the NFLMC for interlocutory appeal on
the legal question of when the labor exemption expires.' 72 The district
court amended its January 29, 1988 order to certify the question of
whether, and to what extent, the labor exemption protects defendants
from antitrust liability, for interlocutory appeal.173 Under the statutory
requirement, the party seeking the appeal must file a petition in the circuit court within ten days of the district court's order. 174 Although the
NFLMC failed to file a petition within ten days of the district court's
167. Id.; see also NLRB Case No. 2-CB-12117.
168. NLRB Memorandum, Case No. 2-CB-12117.
169. Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 818 (D. Minn. 1988).
170. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. IV (union security clause).
171. Telephone interview with Tom DePaso, NFLPA staff attorney and former NLRB staff
attorney (Sept. 7, 1989).
172. Powell v. NFL, 711 F. Supp. 959 (D. Minn. 1989).
173. Id. at 964-65; see also Powell, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988) (contains Jan. 29, 1988
order).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
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order, the court granted the NFLMC's motion for recertification on February 16, 1989.175 The NFLMC then filed a petition to permit interlocutory appeal with the court of appeals. Without ruling on the NFLPA's
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit granted
management's petition on February 24, 1989.176 Accordingly, the
Eighth Circuit heard arguments on the district court's ruling regarding
the expiration of the labor exemption on May 12, 1989.
C. Recent District Court Rulings on Application of the Labor
Exemption
1. The NBPA Suit. The recent NBA-NBPA dispute, like the
NFL-NFLPA dispute, involved an antitrust challenge by the players' association to terms in an expired collective bargaining agreement. The
1983 NBA collective bargaining agreement expired on June 14, 1987.177
After negotiations between the parties failed to produce a new agreement, the NBPA filed an antitrust suit challenging several of the NBA's
restrictions on player mobility and salaries. Both parties filed motions
seeking a preliminary ruling on the issue of whether the labor exemption
continued to shield the restraints from antitrust attack after the expiration of the agreement.178 Thus, the legal issue in the NBA case mirrors
the legal issue in the NFL dispute.
The federal district court in New Jersey recognized that the purpose
of the nonstatutory labor exemption is to balance competing antitrust
and labor policies. In other words, the court determined that application
of the exemption turned on whether labor policy encouraging collective
bargaining deserved preeminence over antitrust policies promoting free
competition under the circumstances of a particular case.1 79 The court
concluded that the balance tipped in favor of the labor laws, and thus the
application of the exemption was appropriate, in cases where the exemp80
tion fostered rather than impeded collective bargaining.1
175. Motion of Defendants for Recertification, Powell, 711 F. Supp. 959 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 1989),
(No. 4-87-917), granted id. (unpublished opinion).
176. Petition for Permission to Appeal and Memorandum in Support of Petition, Powell (No.
89-5091), granted (8th Cir. Feb. 24, 1989).
177. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
178. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
and Declaratory Relief, Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 1987) (No. 87-4189);
Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and
in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment Dismissing the Complaint And
For Joinder of the NBA As a Party, id. (Nov. 23, 1987).
179. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 964-65.
180. Id. at 965-66. The court indicated that the exemption encouraged collective bargaining by
immunizing "only those practices that were included in a collective bargaining agreement after being
subject to arm's-length bargaining[.]" Id..
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After analyzing each of the labor exemption tests proposed by the
League and the union, the district court concluded that none of the proposed tests fostered collective bargaining. The court rejected the owners'

arguments that federal labor law automatically overrides federal antitrust
law, or that the antitrust laws do not reach labor market restraints. 18

The court also rejected the players' argument that the exemption expired
the moment the agreement expired, 1 82 as well as the players' alternate
83
argument that the exemption expired upon impasse.1
After rejecting the parties' proposed tests, the court determined that
the end point of the labor exemption occurred the moment the exemption

no longer fostered collective bargaining.184 Accordingly, the court concluded that the exemption survives only as long as the employer continues to impose the restriction unchanged 8 5 and reasonably believes that
the practice or some variant will be incorporated in the next agreement.

When the employer no longer reasonably believes the restraint will continue, the restraint is no longer the product of arm's-length bargaining
and is subject to antitrust challenge. 86 This point may occur before,

during, or after impasse. Some facts may be relevant both to questions
181. Id. at 964-65. Immunization of the challenged restraints for an indefinite time would, according to the court, discourage collective bargaining; unions would be reluctant to enter into an
agreement if doing so would preclude them from invoking their rights under the antitrust laws. Id
at 966.
182. This proposition, according to the court, was unrealistic in light of an employer's obligation
to maintain the status quo after an agreement's expiration. Id. at 965. The proposition was also
inconsistent with the bargaining history between the parties. During interim periods between collective bargaining agreements, the NBA had historically maintained the status quo with respect to
provisions contained in an expired agreement. Ultimately, these provisions were reincorporated in a
new agreement. The court reasoned that it would be anomalous to immunize the restraints during
the agreement, remove the exemption during the interim period between agreements, and re-immunize the restraints under the new agreement. Id. at 966. Moreover, the simultaneous expiration of
the agreement and exemption also would inhibit the bargaining process. Employers would be reluctant to agree on certain provisions under any circumstances for fear that they would be subsequently
exposed to antitrust liability. Id.
183. Id. at 966-67.
184. Id. at 967.
185. The test imposed by the New Jersey district court requires that the employer, in order to
perpetuate the exemption, maintain the status quo. Under this test, then, the NFLMC presumably
would have lost the exemption, if the exemption had not already expired, when it implemented its
new free agency system on February 1, 1989. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
186. Id. at 967. Although the court acknowledged that no prior cases addressed the issue in a
case involving an expired agreement, it noted that previous courts had typically applied the nonstatutory exemption to immunize restraints to which the parties had agreed. Id. at 965 (citing McCourt
v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197 n.7 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606,
616-18 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
738, 742 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Robertson v.
NBA, 389 F. Supp 867, 886-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). The court reconciled this observation with the
underlying purpose of the labor laws, to foster collective bargaining, and consequently with the
appropriate application of the labor exemption. Immunizing only those practices included in an
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involving impasse and questions involving application of the labor exemption. Nonetheless, the court posited that the presence of impasse and
the scope of the labor exemption were distinct issues.18 7 More specifically, the court recognized that impasse is a labor law concept, one not
developed to deal with the unique intersection of labor and antitrust
88
law.'
The court's test poses several problems. First, the abstract nature of
the test makes it difficult and impractical to apply. A court will have
trouble accurately determining the point when an employer no longer
reasonably believes that the restraint will be reincorporated into a new
agreement. To identify this moment, a court must rely, at least in part,
upon an employer's assertions, even though that employer has an interest
in maintaining that she had a reasonable belief that the provision would
be incorporated after that belief actually ceased.
Admittedly, this problem is a familiar one for courts who routinely
administer reasonable-person tests. More significant is the second criticism of the court's test. Assuming the relevant moment could be identified, it is unclear why the employer's belief or impressions concerning the
likelihood of the continuation of the restraint should be controlling.
Why should the court tie its test to the employer's perceptions of the
negotiations? Why should the matter not be settled by the union's belief?.
The employer's perceptions are derivative; they depend upon the union's
position and perception. Under the court's test, the exemption expires
not at the point in time when the union decides that the restraint will no
longer be continued, but rather when the union convinces the employer
that the restraint will no longer be continued. The court offers no explanation why this point is more appropriate than the actual point when the
union concludes that the restraint will no longer be continued.
Third, the court's test no more serves to promote collective bargaining than the tests proposed by the parties. The union has no more incentive to bargain in good faith under the court's test than under its own
proposed test of immediate expiration. Whatever test or endpoint is
adopted, the players arguably will have the same incentive to do
whatever is necessary, including adopting an intractable position at the
bargaining table, to reach that point.
agreement after arm's-length negotiations prevented unilateral imposition of unagreed upon terms
and thus encouraged good faith bargaining. Bridgeman at 965.
187. The court noted that impasse occurs when the entire bargaining process stops. Thus, particular provisions in the expired agreement might have been rejected prior to impasse. At the same
time, impasse is not equivalent to cessation of negotiations. Impasses may be resolved, and challenged provisions may ultimately be included in a new agreement. Bridgeman at 966-67.
188. Id.
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Fourth, the court's test fails to consider the nature of the parties'
bargaining relationship. As a result, this test is a potential weapon for
the stronger party. The outcome of prior bargaining in the NFL illustrates this point.
As the NFLPA approached the bargaining table in 1977, it had
played three seasons with no agreement, struck twice and won a series of
four antitrust suits. All of these actions concerned free agency-the very
issue at stake in the current dispute.1 89 Despite the union's unequivocal
rejection of the owners' restrictions on free agency, the NFLMC undoubtedly approached the bargaining table in 1977 with a reasonable belief that the restrictions on free agency would be incorporated into a new
agreement. The owners' reasonable belief proved accurate. Because of
the mismatch in bargaining power, the owners simply outlasted the
union.1 90 A similar result is likely to occur in the current dispute. The
NFL undoubtedly believes it will eventually prevail upon the NFLPA to
include the challenged restraints in a new agreement, despite the union's
resistance. The court's test, then, could effectively result in the indefinite
immunization of the challenged restraints.
Fifth, the test ignores the distinction between the labor exemption
and the status quo doctrine, a doctrine under federal labor law that requires an employer to maintain provisions in an expired collective bargaining agreement.191 Ironically, the court recognized a similar
distinction between the labor exemption and impasse. The court concluded that impasse is a labor concept, rather than a concept intended to
accommodate the intersection of antitrust and labor law.1 92 Inconsistently, however, the court rejected the argument for simultaneous expiration of the agreement and the exemption, concluding that simultaneous
93
expiration was inconsistent with the status quo doctrine.'
In concluding that the status quo doctrine eliminated the possibility
of immediate expiration of the exemption, the court failed to recognize
that the policies under the NLRA were only one of two factors to be
considered in disputes involving the scope of the labor exemption. Thus,
189. The collective bargaining agreement executed in 1977 contained significant restrictions on
free agency. See 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement art. XV.
190. In the past, management always has been.able to outlast the union until enough players
have become both impatient and dissatisfied with the union. Convinced that the union's demands
are unrealistic, undesirable, or simply unattainable because management will never agree to them
under any circumstances, the players have yielded in past confrontations. See supra notes 115, 16265 and accompanying text.
191. E.g., NLRB v. Cauthrone, 691 F.2d 1023, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
192. Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965-67 (D.N.J. 1987); see also supra notes 186-88
and accompanying text.
193. 675 F. Supp. at 965-67.
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the court failed to accommodate competing antitrust and labor policies.
Further, the status quo doctrine is a labor law doctrine; it has nothing to
do with the antitrust laws. Like impasse, it is not determinative of the
scope of the labor exemption. The court simply failed to distinguish between a labor doctrine involving the continuation of provisions in an expired agreement and the scope of a waiver, adopted in the underlying
agreement, of a party's rights under the antitrust laws once the agreement has expired.
2. The NFLPA Suit. Like its counterpart in New Jersey, the district court in Minnesota rejected each of the tests proposed by the parties. The court rejected the owners' arguments that the challenged
restraints were automatically immunized from antitrust attack1 94 or that
the status quo doctrine justified indefinite immunization of terms in an
expired agreement. 195 The court also rejected the players' argument that
the exemption expires when the union makes unequivocally clear that it
96
will no longer consent to a continuation of the challenged provision.
Finally, the court rejected the test adopted by the New Jersey district
court. 197

194. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 788 (D. Minn. 1988). The court found no basis for
absolute and indefinite immunity merely because the challenged restraints involved mandatory subjects of bargaining or because of the existence of the collective bargaining relationship. The court
recognized that the purpose of the labor exemption was to accommodate competing antitrust and
labor policies. Id. at 782 (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S.
616, 621-22 (1975); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965)). Absolute immunity would subvert completely federal antitrust law rather than strike the proper balance
between competing federal labor and antitrust policies. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 783.
195. The court concluded that the exemption must survive the agreement in order to foster
collective bargaining. Id. at 785 (quoting Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advance Light
Weight Concrete Co., 779 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 108 S.Ct. 830 (1988)). However, it
rejected the argument that prior approval immunized the restraint indefinitely. Indefinite immunity
would accord greater longevity to illegal provisions than to lawful ones, which expire upon impasse.
678 F. Supp. at 788. The court therefore declined to extend "indefinite, blanket protection" to
union-employer agreements. Id. at 783.
196. Id. at 786. Such a test, reasoned the court, would invite the union to make it "unequivocally clear" at the earliest possible moment that it no longer consents to a particular provision. The
employer then would be subject to potential antitrust liability the moment the agreement expired, a
result the court felt would impede, rather than foster, the collective bargaining process. Id. at 787.
The court also indicated that the union's test disregarded, and was inconsistent with, an employer's
obligation to maintain the status quo until impasse. The court could not endorse a test under which
an employer could be charged with committing an unfair labor practice if the employer unilaterally
liberalized player restraints to avoid antitrust liability following the expiration of the agreement. Id.
197. The court rejected the New Jersey court's test for the same reason it rejected the union's
proposed test. The players would have the same incentive to "furnish the requisite indicia of disaffection and unwillingness to bargain" in order to establish either that the employer could no longer
reasonably believe the restraint would continue, or that it had unequivocally indicated that it no
longer consented to the restraint. Id.
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Instead, the court held that the labor exemption survives the agreement until the parties reach an impasse concerning the challenged restraint. Thereafter, the restraint no longer warrants immunity from
antitrust attack. According to the court, this test promotes good faith
bargaining after the expiration of the agreement and, therefore, strikes an
appropriate balance between competing antitrust and labor policies. 198
The court's use of impasse stands out as a convenient compromise of
the parties' positions on the moment at which the labor exemption appropriately expires. Despite the Minnesota district court's assertions to
the contrary,1 99 however, its test does not promote collective bargaining
any more than the other proposed tests. Nothing in the court's opinion
suggests that the union, under the impasse test, has any incentive not to
attempt to cause impasse at the earliest moment in the negotiations. To
maximize its leverage, the union presumably would want to reach the
moment when the exemption expires whether that moment was at impasse or upon the unequivocal withdrawal of consent.
Ironically, the Minnesota district court, preoccupied with the status
quo doctrine, flatly rejected one test that would likely foster collective
bargaining.2°° If the exemption expires with the agreement and the employer must negotiate union consent for continued immunization, the
employer must decide either to bargain over or to eliminate the restraint.
Although a restraint may be illegal, the employer can immunize it
through negotiations. It follows that an employer who believes that the
restraint is desirable has a true incentive to bargain.
Moreover, the Minnesota district court's test raises the possibility
that the NLRB will be drawn into disputes through an ancillary unfair
labor practice charge. 20 1 Because of the NLRB's procedures, the Board's
involvement in any dispute will likely delay the resolution of that dispute.20 2 This is precisely what happened in the current NFLPA-NFL
antitrust suit.
By the end of December 1987, when the Minnesota district court
heard oral arguments on various motions in the NFLPA-NFL dispute,
the NFL already had filed a refusal-to-bargain charge with the Board
198. Id. at 788-89.

199. Id. at 789.
200. See id. at 784-85 (rejecting test that labor exemption expires with the agreement).
201. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 641 F.2d 90, 94-95 (3d
Cir.) (when labor law issue before district court is also pending before NLRB, court should defer to
the Board for resolution of such questions), petitionfor writ of mandamus andprohibition denied,
451 U.S. 905 (1981).

202. See Lock, Employer UnfairLaborPractices,supra note 130, at 190-98 (discussing the complexity of NLRB proceedings and the likelihood of substantial delays).
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against the NFLPA. 20 3 The charge, if meritorious, would have precluded a finding that the parties had reached impasse, since impasse requires that the parties through good faith bargaining have reached a
deadlock in negotiations. 2°4 Since the refusal-to-bargain charge was still
pending, the resolution of the antitrust dispute was delayed.
Within the context of professional sports, the type of delay caused
by a pending refusal-to-bargain charge produces a situation that will be
difficult to remedy should the union ultimately prevail in its lawsuit. The
standard NFL player contract expires annually on February 1.205 Approximately 450 NFL players were not under contract for the 1988 sea-

son and consequently were free agents as of February 1, 1988.206 Absent
a pre-season strike, NFL players report to training camp in July to prepare for the upcoming season. Signing a standard NFL player contract is
a prerequisite to participating in pre-season practice. Accordingly, as
training camp approached in 1988, more and more of those 450 veteran
free agents signed new contracts under the right of first refusal/compensation system contained in the expired 1982 agreement. Should the Minnesota district court subsequently conclude that the labor exemption had
expired on or about February 1, 1988, it will have a difficult task trying
to determine what salaries those players would have received in an open
market. Thus, the Board's involvement and attendant delay remains
critical to the equitable resolution of the current antitrust dispute.
3. Analysis of Both Tests. Although the Minnesota district
court's test is functionally distinguishable from the test adopted by the
New Jersey district court, the two tests are based in part on the same
legal premise. Both courts concluded that the status quo doctrine was
relevant to the scope of the labor exemption. Moreover, both courts
failed to distinguish between a labor law principle which mandates the
survival of terms in an expired agreement and an exemption which is
designed to accommodate competing antitrust and labor policies. As a
result, each court concluded that the simultaneous expiration of the
agreement and exemption was inconsistent with the employer's obliga20 7
tion to maintain the status quo.
203. NLRB Case No. 2-CB-12117.
204. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 784 (D. Minn. 1988) (nonstatutory labor exemption
continues until parties reach impasse after good faith bargaining); Taft Broadcasting Co., 163
N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967) (where genuine impasse existed, employer could unilaterally institute his
proposed changes), enforced sub nom. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395
F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 65 (1964) (after impasse
and strike an employer may unilaterally implement proposed benefits as new employment terms).
205. See NFL Player Contract t 1 (rev. 1982).
206. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781.
207. Id. at 784-85; Bridgerhan v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987).
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In reaching its conclusion, the Minnesota district court expressly
refused to adopt a rule that it believed would expose an employer to immediate antitrust liability for maintaining the status quo. 20 8 This concern is not valid. An employer should be exposed to antitrust liability for
continuing to enforce a provision that violates the Sherman Act if the
union has ceased to consent to that provision. Such a provision is immunized only by the union's consent. 20 9 Once that consent is withdrawn,
the employer should not be able to hide behind a labor law principle
requiring it to maintain the status quo. The underlying purpose of the
status quo doctrine is to foster collective bargaining.2 10 If the union no
longer desires the challenged provision, elimination of that provision
should not violate the status quo doctrine.
Both courts suggested that subjecting an employer to "instant" or
"immediate" antitrust liability for maintaining a provision that the employer is obligated to maintain under the status quo doctrine would be
inequitable. 2 11 This concern, though, ignores the practical aspects of
professional sports. The professional sports industry is one of the few
industries in which individual and collective bargaining exist side by
side. 2 12 Because expiration of individual player contracts is not likely to
coincide with expiration of the collective agreement, withdrawal of the
labor exemption will not generally result in immediate antitrust liability
for employers.
Individual NFL contracts expire on February 1 of each year, 213
while the 1977 collective bargaining agreement expired on July 15,
1982,214 and the 1982 agreement expired on August 31, 1987.215 In each
instance, virtually every NFL player remained under contract at the time
the collective bargaining agreement expired. Clearly, NFL owners were
not exposed to significant antitrust liability between July 15, 1982 and
208. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 785.
209. See, eg., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); see also California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Contractors, 648 F.2d
527, 536 (9th Cir. 1980) ("the nonstatutory exemption may be invoked only in cases involving agreements between unions and employers on wages or working conditions"), rev'd on othergrounds, 459
U.S. 519 (1983).
210. R. GORMAN, supra note 66, at 450-51, 463-64.
211. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 786; Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 965.
212. Players' associations historically have waived their rights to negotiate salaries above minimums established through collective bargaining, thereby permitting individual player-team salary
negotiations. See, e.g., 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XXII.
213. NFL Player Contract %1.
214. 1977 NFL Agreement, supra note 120, art. XXXVI.
215. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XXXVIII.
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February 1, 1983, or between August 31, 1987 and February 1, 1988.216
Although each year a number of NFL players become free agents on
February 1, few players sign new contracts prior to, on, or even soon
after that date. Consequently, the owners' potential risk of antitrust liability would begin after February 1 and increase as training camp approaches and more players sign contracts under the challenged system.
In the current dispute, the time period preceding the expiration of
the agreement through sometime after the following February 1 offered
the parties an opportunity to reach an agreement without raising antitrust concerns. Their inability to reach an agreement during that period
suggests that the labor exemption, under either of the district courts'
tests, expired prior to termination of the individual player contracts on
February 1. Although the negotiations had completely stalled long
before the following February 1, the owners faced no significant antitrust
2 17
liability until after that date.
The Minnesota district court also alluded to the "catch 22" implications for an employer who decided to ignore the significance of the status
quo doctrine. The employer could liberalize a rule in an effort to avoid
antitrust liability and conceivably violate the unfair labor practice provi-

sions of the NLRA for doing

S0.218

This concern also has no merit.

An employer should be charged with committing an unfair labor
practice for unilaterally liberalizing challenged restraints following the
expiration of the agreement. The issue of liability for unilateral changes
in working conditions, however, has nothing to do with the simultaneous
expiration of the agreement and the exemption. Unilateral liberalization
of a challenged restraint is the exact type of unilateral change in working
conditions precluded by the status quo doctrine. Such a change would
notify employees that the employer will not deal with the union, that the
employees do not need the union, or that the employees can do better
without the union. Clearly, such a change would undermine the union's
216. NFL Player Contract %5 (rev. 1982) states in relevant part, "For purposes of this contract,
a collective bargaining agreement will be deemed to be "in existence" during its stated term or
during any period for which the parties to that agreement agree to extend it."
217. The NBA and NBPA agreed to avoid the possibility of immediate antitrust liability for the
owners where the collective bargaining agreement and individual player contracts expired simultaneously. The 1983 NBA agreement expired on June 14, 1987. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text. The standard NBA player contract also expired at the conclusion of the 1987 season. See
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Declaratory Relief at 8, Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. Oct 1, 1987) (No. 87-4189). To avoid
the immediate risk of antitrust liability, the parties declared a five-month moratorium on legal action
and the signing of veteran contracts while they continued collective negotiations.
218. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 785-87 (D.Minn. 1988).
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authority. 219
If, however, the union demands the total or partial elimination of
the challenged restraint and management acquiesces, the elimination is
not unilateral and does not violate the status quo doctrine. 220 The
union's demand implies consent. Otherwise, the union could demand the
elimination of a particular restraint and then file a refusal-to-bargain

charge against an employer for acquiescing to the union's demand.
Although unilateral changes in working conditions alone can violate
NLRA section 8(a)(5), 221 resolution of most refusal-to-bargain charges
depends upon the totality of circumstances.2 22 Consequently, the Board

would not issue an 8(a)(5) complaint involving a unilateral change that
the union demands and over which the union has filed an antitrust suit.
IV.

THE NFL OWNERS' ARGUMENTS

In each of the prior player restraint cases, management claimed that
the nonstatutory labor exemption immunized the challenged restraints
from antitrust attack. 223 As discussed above, these cases are factually
distinguishable from the current dispute between the NFL and the

NFLPA. In the earlier disputes, a fledgling union challenged restraints
that had been unilaterally imposed by the League prior to the union's
existence. 224 Moreover, no court determined whether the policies of the
NLRA control the outcome of a dispute involving terms in an expired
225

agreement.
Despite these differences, however, the owners cite two prior cases,
Mackey v. NFL,226 and Wood v. NBA, 227 more frequently than any other
219. See, eg., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962); NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills,
337 U.S. 217, 223-25 (1949). See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 66, at 439-43 (collecting cases
where employers' unilateral action was found to be unfair labor practice).
When it issued its opinion that collective bargaining provisions were immunized from antitrust
attack until impasse, the district court declined to determine the presence or absence of impasse in
the NFLPA-NFL dispute because of a pending refusal-to-bargain charge filed by management
against the union. 678 F. Supp. at 789. Whether the NFLPA believed that the parties had bargained to impasse over the new system or were concerned that the district court would once again
defer to the Board and further delay a hearing on the merits, the NFLPA declined to file an unfair
labor practice charge with the Board when the League implemented its new system on February 1,
1989.
220. R. GORMAN, supra note 66, at 445.
221. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
222. See, ag., Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1981).
223. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977).
224. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
226. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
227. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
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authority in their briefs. Wood involved a challenge to restraints in an
unexpired collective bargaining agreement by a prospective player and,
consequently, is not particularly pertinent to the current dispute. 228

Mackey, however, has been cited by every court that has considered the
legality of player restraints since the Eighth Circuit's decision in that

case in
A.

1976.229

Mackey v. NFL
Mackey involved a challenge to the Rozelle Rule. 230 Plaintiffs con-

tended that the rule impeded the movement and suppressed the salaries
of free agents. 23 1 The district court agreed. In an opinion issued after
the expiration of the 1970 agreement, the district court rejected the
League's argument that the Rule was immune from antitrust attack,
holding that it violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 232 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. 233 The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the labor exemption is particularly significant since the test it articulated has been
used by every court since that has analyzed the antitrust implications of
234
player restraints.
In analyzing Mackey, the Eighth Circuit recognized that Supreme
Court precedents were factually dissimilar from the case before it. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the principles articulated in those prior
cases reflected the proper accommodation of competing federal labor and
antitrust policy. 235 After extracting various principles from these cases,

the court fashioned a three-pronged test to determine whether the labor
228. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Dismissing the Complaint and for Joinder of the National Basketball Players Association as a Party at 13-21, Bridgeman
v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 1987) (No. 87-4189) [hereinafter NBA Memorandum].
See also Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim
for Declaratory Judgment at 10-16, Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 1987) (No.
4-87-917) [hereinafter NFL Memorandum].
229. The NBA owners advanced arguments in Bridgeman similar to those raised by the NFL
owners in Powell. Citations to the NBA owners' arguments infra demonstrate this similarity, and
indicate variations the NFL owners may adopt.
230. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing Rozelle Rule).
231. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
232. 407 F. Supp. at 1007.
233. Mackey, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). The Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's finding that the Rozelle Rule was a per se violation of the Sherman
Act, but concluded nonetheless that the Rozelle Rule was unreasonable under the rule of reason. Id.
at 618-22.
234. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 962 n.6 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. California Sports,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C.
1986).
235. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
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exemption immunized the Rozelle Rule from antitrust attack. Under
this test, federal labor policy appropriately overrides federal antitrust
policy and the labor exemption applies if: 1) the restraint primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship; 2) the
agreement concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and 3)
236
the agreement is the product of bona-fide arm's-length bargaining.
Applying its test to the facts before it, the court found that the Rozelle Rule primarily affected the parties to the collective bargaining relationship and concerned a mandatory subject of bargaining. 237 After
reviewing the bargaining history between the NFL and NFLPA, however, the court concluded that the Rozelle Rule was not the product of
arm's-length negotiations. It found that the union, from the point of its
formal recognition as the players' exclusive bargaining representative until the Rozelle Rule was included in the 1970 agreement, "stood in a
relatively weak bargaining position vis-a-vis the clubs" and was not
strong enough to negotiate any modifications of the previously adopted
2 39
Rule. 23 8 For that reason the court withheld the exemption.
Both the League and the players' association cite Mackey to support
their respective positions. They disagree, though, over the significance
an agreement has in the Eighth Circuit's three-pronged test. The union
argues that the existence of an agreement is indispensable to the court's
test and accordingly to the application of the exemption. 24 The NFL
owners, on the other hand, argue that the existence of an agreement is
irrelevant, provided the challenged restraint satisfies each prong of the
test. In other words, the owners argue that the labor exemption applies
absent an agreement if the challenged restraint concerns a mandatory
bargaining subject, primarily affects the parties, and results from arm's241
length bargaining.
Although the Mackey court specifically declined to address the sig236. Id.
237. Id. at 615.
238. Id.
239. The Mackey court expressly declined to consider whether the labor exemption expires upon
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 543 F.2d at 616 n.18. But because the Rozelle
Rule was not the product of arm's-length negotiations, it was.subject to antitrust attack priorto the
expiration of the 1970 agreement. Thus, the court was not forced to determine whether the Rule
would have been subject to antitrust attack after the 1970 agreement expired.
240. Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment at
14-19, Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 781-82 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 1987) (No. 4-87-917); see also
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Declaratory Relief at 29, 32-34, Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp, 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987) (No. 87-4189)
(NBPA argument).
241. NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 13-16, 28, 33; see also NBA Memorandum, supra
note 228, at 22-28, 50-55.
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nificance of the expiration of the agreement,2 42 the court's opinion suggests that the existence of an agreement is relevant to the applicability of
the exemption, provided the agreement is the product of arm's-length
negotiations. First, the court recognized the significance of an agreement
in two of the three prongs of its test. Provided that the challenged restraint primarily affects the bargaining parties, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the exemption applies where the "agreement sought to be
exempted" concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and is
24 3
the product of arm's-length negotiations.
Second, the court also recognized the significance of an agreement in
its exemption analysis when it rejected the players' assertion that only
employees are entitled to the benefits of the exemption. The purpose of
the nonstatutory labor exemption is to further the national policy favoring collective bargaining. In the court's words, the exemption extends to
agreements and, as a consequence, the benefits of the exemption logically
extend to both parties to the agreement. 244 Nothing in the court's opinion suggests that the use of the word "agreement" was inadvertent or
accidental.
The NFL owners' interpretation of Mackey is inconsistent with the
Eighth Circuit's analysis. According to the League, the labor exemption
immunizes anticompetitive restraints for an indefinite period even though
they are contained in an agreement for a specific term.245 Yet, the Eighth
Circuit's failure to determine whether the exemption and agreement expire simultaneously indicates neither that the agreement is irrelevant to
the application of the exemption nor that the exemption continues indefinitely after the agreement expires. The court's repeated reference to an
"agreement" or union approval suggests that the exemption must expire
at some point. Thus, regardless of whether it expires simultaneously
with the agreement, the exemption becomes more tenuous the more removed union approval or a bona-fide agreement is from the imposition of
the restraint.
B.

JudicialNon-intervention

1. The NLRA and Intrusion into the BargainingProcess. The
NFL owners also advance two policy arguments in the current dispute to
support their position that the labor exemption survives the expiration of
242. See supra note 239.
243. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 612.
245. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant's Counterclaim
for Declaratory Judgment at 28-33, Powell, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 1987) (No. 4-87917).
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the agreement. First, they argue that the comprehensive framework of
collective bargaining established by Congress prohibits judicial involvement in fashioning the substantive terms of collective bargaining agree-

ments. Under this view the purpose of the NLRA is to promote
industrial peace through collective bargaining. 24 6 When a majority of

employees designate a union to represent them, an employer must cease
negotiating with individual employees and bargain in good faith with the
employees' representative concerning wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. 247 These subjects are known as mandatory

subjects of collective bargaining. 248
Congress designed the procedural framework of the NLRA to ensure that employers and employee representatives will make an honest
effort to resolve their differences at the bargaining table. Congress
clearly intended the parties involved in a collective bargaining relation-

ship to resolve their own disputes. 249 The federal labor laws, however,
do not require the parties to reach an agreement. 250 The Act mandates
the collective bargaining process; it does not mandate an agreement or
dictate the substantive terms of any bargain between the parties.
A fundamental corollary to the collective bargaining framework
mandated by the NLRA is that the courts ordinarily may not review the
substantive terms of the parties' agreement. 251 Moreover, absent an
agreement, courts may not intervene in labor disputes and impose their
own views of a desirable settlement. 252 Congress designated the bargain-

ing process as the primary method for resolving labor disputes involving
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. ,The results of the collective
bargaining process are to be determined n 6 t by the courts but by the
246. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Section 151 reads in pertinent part: "It is
declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining."
247. See id. § 159(a) ("Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
248. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 667, 674 (1981).
249. See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132, 150 n.11 (1976), overruled, Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local
54, 468 U.S. 491 (1984); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960).
250. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (to bargain collectively creates an obligation to meet and
confer in good faith but "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession").
251. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 753 (1985) (Congress not
concerned with substance of agreement); Insurance Agents'Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 483-87 (same).
252. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1970) (government does not attempt to
control results of collective bargaining).
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parties on the basis of their respective bargaining power.2 53 Accordingly,
the Act authorizes employees to resist at the bargaining table undesirable
terms or conditions of employment and, if necessary, to use economic
254
weapons to achieve their goal.
The NFL owners maintain that judicial determination of the parties'
respective rights under the antitrust laws constitutes judicial intrusion in
the bargaining process. 25 5 According to the owners, the current litigation involves a dispute between employees, represented by a labor union,
and a multi-employer bargaining unit.256 Because the challenged practices are mandatory subjects of bargaining, 257 the parties must resolve
this dispute exclusively through the collective bargaining framework established by Congress and not in an action brought under the Sherman
Act; under this analysis, antitrust review is simply inconsistent with the
labor policy favoring collective bargaining. 258
The owners also argue that the practical effects of judicial intervention are inconsistent with the purposes of the NLRA. The use of the
antitrust laws as a weapon in the union's arsenal effectively permits the
union to dictate terms of employment, thereby creating a strong disincentive for the union to bargain in good faith. 2 59 Faced with possible Sherman Act sanctions, management would be forced to capitulate to the
union or risk immediate liability for treble damages. Thus, according to
the owners, an actual or threatened antitrust attack distorts the bargaining process by artificially inflating the union's bargaining leverage.
The owners' argument against judicial involvement in labor disputes
fails because it lacks consistency with the resolution of previous antitrust
actions in the professional sports industry. This argument, that judicial
determination of the parties' rights under the antitrust laws undermines
the collective bargaining framework mandated by the NLRA, cannot be
reconciled with the district courts' role in the judicially-supervised Oscar
Robertson Settlement Agreement in 1976 between the NBA and
NBPA, 260 and the 1978 Alexander Settlement between the NFL and
253. See, e.g., Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 150 n.l1; InsuranceAgents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 488-89.
254. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982) (nothing in NLRA "diminishes in any way the right to strike").
255. NBA Memorandum, supra note 228, at 19; NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 11, 1617.
256. NBA Memorandum, supra note 228, at 21; NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 10-16.
257. Cf Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977)
(Rozelle Rule is mandatory bargaining subject).
258. NBA Memorandum, supra note 228, at 20-21, 45-46; NFL Memorandum, supra note 228,
at 11-12, 16, 25-28.
259. NBA Memorandum, supra note 228, at 42-46; NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 11.
260. Stipulation Settlement Agreement at 47, Robertson v. NBA, 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
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NFLPA. 26 1 Both district courts clearly recognized the union's right to
seek redress for antitrust violations, and both were willing to oversee the
262
ultimate settlement agreement between the parties.
The owners' argument for judicial non-intervention is also inconsistent with management's own conduct during previous disputes with the
union. Individual teams did not hesitate to seek injunctive relief in 1982
to prevent players from participating in non-League-sponsored all-star
games during the 1982 strike.263 Filing unfair labor practice charges
with the Board, a remedy the owners now argue is the exclusive remedy
in a labor dispute,264 would not have precluded the players from partici2 65
pating in the all-star games.
Moreover, the argument for judicial non-intervention is based on an
alleged desire to comply with the collective bargaining framework established by Congress. 266 Yet, the League's concern over proper deference
to the NLRA is not convincing in light of the fact that it appears to have
incorporated violations of the Act as a r6utine part of its bargaining
strategy. If one theme permeates the NLRA, it is the parties' obligation
to act in good faith. 267 The owners' conduct during previous collective
bargaining, however, has been inconsistent with this obligation. The
number of unfair labor practice charges filed, the complaints issued
against the NFL, and the League's apparent disregard for NLRB procedures illustrate the owners' unwillingness to comply with either the letter
or the spirit of the NLRA. 268 In response to a recent Board decision to
issue a complaint against the NFL, for example, NFLMC member Tex
Schramm stated, "I'm never surprised when the NLRB rules in favor of
261. The 1977 collective bargaining agreement was incorporated in a class action settlement,
approved by the district court in Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) .61,730, at 72,99973,004 (D. Minn. 1977), aff'd sub noa. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
262. Stipulation Settlement Agreement at 47, Robertson, 72 F.R.D. 64.
263. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
264. The NBA owners have been explicit in adopting this position:
Any objection the Players Association may have to the NBA's adherence to the terms of
the prior collective bargaining agreement while the parties negotiate toward a new agreement can and must be redressed through the substantive coercive remedies provided by the
NLRA, such as the filing of an unfair labor practice charge or by engaging in the ultimate
economic sanction of a strike.
NBA Memorandum, supra note 228, at 20.
265. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
266. NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 13-16; see also NBA Memorandum, supranote 228,

at 20-21.
267. See, eg., 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) (employer cannot refuse to bargain collectively with
his employee's representatives); id. § 158(b)(3) (a labor organization or its agents cannot refuse to
bargain collectively with an employer); id. § 158(d) (to "bargain collectively" defined as mutual
obligation of employer and representative of employees to meet at reasonable times and "confer in
good faith").
268. See, e.g., supra notes 149-61.
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the union. You know what the penalty is, don't you? They tell you not
'269
to do it again.
The owners' argument for judicial non-intervention is further undermined by the lack of any evidence to support their dire predictions concerning the effects of withholding the labor exemption. Past judicial
involvement has neither forced management to capitulate to the union's
demands nor permitted the union to dictate the terms of an agreement.
NFL owners did not capitulate to the union in 1977 in the face of adverse
antitrust decisions: to the contrary, the union was unable to impose its
demands upon management in the 1977 agreement 270 despite its antitrust
victories in Kapp v. NFL,27 1 Mackey, 272 and Smith v. Pro FootballInc.273
Given the unique nature of the collective bargaining relationship in professional sports, 274 it is unlikely that a judicial victory would enable the
union to do so in 1989.
2. The Bargaining Relationship in Professional Sports. The
unique nature of the bargaining relationship in professional sports also
undermines the owners' argument that the resolution of the parties' respective rights under the antitrust laws will create an incentive for the
union not to bargain in good faith. The lack of job security and the
length of most players' careers ensures that the players will pressure the
union to bargain in good faith to reach an agreement. If it refuses to
reach an agreement, the union can either strike or play without an agreement. Since the NFL player's average career spans approximately four
years and few players possess skills as marketable or remunerative as
their skills as professional athletes, 275 playing without an agreement or
striking jeopardizes a significant portion of the career and earning potential of many players. Thus, neither strategy is likely to receive wholehearted support from the players, regardless of management's position at
the bargaining table or the outcome of the current antitrust dispute.
Moreover, judicial resolution of the underlying antitrust issues will
not permit the court to either intrude into the bargaining process or
269. NLRB Tackles the Cowboys, USA Today, Mar. 16, 1988, at C3, col. 5.
270. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
271. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that several NFL rules, including Rozelle Rule,
were unreasonable restraints on trade), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
907 (1979).
272. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (Rozelle
Rule overly restrictive, deterred free agency, decreased players' bargaining power, and violates § 1 of
Sherman Act); see also supra notes 230-45.
273. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (NFL draft undeniably anticompetitive, violates § 1 of
Sherman Act).
274. See infra notes 275-84 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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shape the substantive terms of the ultimate agreement in a manner contrary to congressional intent. When it enacted the federal labor statutes,
Congress clearly intended to limit judicial involvement in labor disputes.
The relevant provisions of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act preclude courts from enjoining various types of concerted activity in
labor disputes. 276 The NLRA compels parties in a collective bargaining
relationship to seek redress for unfair labor practices from the NLRB
rather than the courts. 277 Asking a court to enjoin protected concerted
activity or redress an unfair labor practice, however, is certainly distinguishable from seeking a declaration of the parties respective rights
under the antitrust laws regarding provisions in an expired collective bargaining agreement.
Although Congress intended the NLRA to prohibit judicial involvement in labor disputes, no authority exists to support the owners' argument that determination of the parties' rights under the antitrust laws is
the type of judicial involvement in the bargaining process with which
Congress had concern. This interpretation of the labor exemption ignores Mackey, which other courts have relied on in refusing to immunize
challenged restraints from antitrust attack. The owners cite Mackey to
support their position but fail to explain how the court's involvement in
Mackey, as well as in Smith and Kapp, differs from judicial involvement
in the current dispute. According to the owners' interpretation of the
labor exemption, those cases should have emerged, if at all, as refusal-to2 78
bargain charges under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.
Resolution of the underlying antitrust dispute can coexist with judicial reluctance to shape the terms of the ultimate agreement. 27 9 The purpose of limiting judicial intervention is to preserve the parties' right to
arrive at their own agreement. Certainly, judicial condemnation of the
challenged restraints may benefit the union at the bargaining table; it has
the potential to shape the terms of the agreement in the same manner
that a declaration of the parties' respective rights under the labor laws or
any other federal statute will shape the agreement. As the owners admit,
however, the challenged restraints involve mandatory subjects of bargaining.2 80 The parties thus have an obligation to bargain over the re276. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 962 n.5 (2d Cir. 1987). ("Any claim of unreasonable
bargaining behavior must be pursued in unfair labor practice proceeding charging a refusal to bargain in good faith, . . . not in action under Sherman Act.")
278. See supra notes 260-74 and accompanying text.
279. Wood, 809 F.2d at 962 n.6 (declining offer to find other avenues of compromise due to
potential for a strike).
280. NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 2. In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
the Rozelle Rule was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th
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straints, regardless of the outcome in the current litigation. 2 81 In 1977,
for example, the parties executed an agreement that contained restraints
similar to those condemned in Kapp, Mackey, and Smith. 282 Whether
the Minnesota district court similarly condemns the challenged restraints
or instead concludes that they are immunized from antitrust attack, the
parties will ultimately determine in what form, if any, the restraints will
continue to exist.
More importantly, the owners' interpretation implies that the exemption immunizes restraints involving mandatory bargaining subjects
by virtue of the union's existence. Under this analysis, the exemption
would apply from the moment of union certification. In essence, this
interpretation equates the right to form a union and engage in various
concerted activities, protected under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts, 28 3 with the mere potential to bargain over mandatory subjects.
Such an interpretation completely eliminates the distinction that courts
consistently have recognized between the statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions. It completely ignores the fact that the nonstatutory labor exemption evolved after Congress enacted the federal labor statutes
because the courts recognized that those statutes authorized collective
bargaining without immunizing restraints in collective bargaining
28 4
agreements.
In fact, absolute judicial refusal to determine the parties' antitrust
rights is inconsistent with the existence of the labor exemption. If judicial reluctance to shape the terms of an agreement precludes courts from
resolving antitrust disputes, the labor exemption would be unnecessary.
Courts would not have created the nonstatutory labor exemption to immunize provisions from antitrust attack if the policy ofjudicial non-intervention already accomplished the same purpose.
C. Status Quo Doctrine
1. The Owners' Policy Arguments. The owners argue in the alternative that contemporaneous expiration of the exemption and the collective bargaining agreement is inconsistent with the status quo doctrine.
This argument, unlike the argument for judicial non-intervention, can be
reconciled with judicial involvement in the Robertson and Alexander setCir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). The right of first refusal/compensation system has the
same impact on player mobility and salaries.
281. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1982).
282. 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 120, art. XII (on player contracts); id.
art. XIII (on college draft); id. art. XIV (on option clause); id. art. XV (on first refusal and
compensation).
283. See supra notes 67-69, 71-73 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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tlement agreements, as well as with the decisions in Smith and Mackey.
Nonetheless, the owners' attempt to equate the policies which justify obligating an employer to maintain the status quo with those underlying

the labor exemption is a distortion of federal labor law.
The status quo doctrine limits employers' ability to change working
conditions unilaterally while no agreement is in effect. The status quo
obligation requires employers to continue in effect provisions of an ex-

pired agreement, 2 5 regardless of whether the parties intended the provision to survive the expiration of the agreement. 28 6 Failure to maintain
the terms of an expired agreement during negotiations for a new agree28 7
ment constitutes bad faith.
To support their position that the labor exemption extends beyond

the expiration of the agreement, the owners raise two policy arguments
that incorporate the status quo rationale. First, they contend that the
underlying policy of the labor exemption, like the policy underlying the
status quo doctrine, is to promote collective bargaining. Thus, the same

policy that justifies requiring an employer to maintain the status quo after an agreement expires also justifies application of the labor exemption
after expiration of the agreement. 288 Second, the owners contend that it
would be inconsistent with federal labor policy to expose management to

antitrust liability for practices the owners are required to maintain under
the NLRA. 28 9 Neither of these policy arguments is persuasive.
The League's argument that the policy underlying the labor exemption is somehow synonymous with that of the status quo doctrine is misleading. The general policy underlying the status quo doctrine, like the

policy underlying all principles of federal labor law, is to promote collective bargaining. 290 To the extent that the labor exemption immunizes
285. See NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 29-31 (citing Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133,
137-38 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 373 F.2d 595, 598 (4th Cir. 1967)); see also NBA
Memorandum, supra note 228, at 28-29 (citing NLRB v. Cauthorne, 691 F.2d 1023, 1025 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (quoting NLRB v. Carilli, 648 F.2d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 1981)); Southwestern Steel & Supply,
Inc. v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
286. See Southwestern Steel & Supply, 806 F.2d at 1114.
287. NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 31 (citing Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v.
Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 779 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1043
(1987)).
288. See NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 31-34; see also NBA Memorandum, supra note
228, at 22, 28, 38, 50-55.
289. See NFL Memorandum, supra note 228, at 31-34; see also NBA Memorandum, supra note
228, at 30.
290. See, eg., LaborersHealth & Welfare Trust Fund, 779 F.2d at 500 ("Freezing the status quo
ante after a collective agreement has expired promotes industrial peace by fostering a non-coercive
atmosphere that is conducive to serious negotiations on a new contract."). The NBA owners cite
this case to support their argument that it would be inconsistent with national labor policy to impose
antitrust liability for practices an employer is required to maintain. NBA Memorandum, supra note
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restraints contained in a bona-fide arm's-length agreement, the labor ex-

emption also fosters collective bargaining. Obviously, neither party
would want to bargain away any benefit in exchange for a provision that
could subsequently be challenged on antitrust grounds. To suggest, however, that this common purpose requires that the exemption outlive the
agreement obscures the policy distinction between the exemption and
status quo doctrine.
The NLRA was designed to eliminate "obstructions to the free flow
of commerce.., by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining."2 9 1 This policy is enforced under the unfair labor practice

provisions of the Act.292 An employer commits an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain collectively in good faith
with the employees' exclusive bargaining representative.2 93 Although
many violations of section 8(a)(5) are established by an employer's overall bargaining conduct, 294 certain specific conduct alone violates the obli228, at 29-30. An alternative interpretation of this case is that the status quo doctrine fosters the
collective bargaining process by protecting the authority of the union.
291. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
292. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982) (enumerating employer unfair labor practices); § 158(b) (enumerating employee unfair labor practices).
293. Id. § 158(a)(5). See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 783-84 (D. Minn. 1988) (agreement
sought to be exempted must be product of bona-fide arm's-length negotiations for collective bargaining policy to override antitrust laws) (quoting Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977)).
294. See, eg., NLRB v. Cauthorne, 691 F.2d 1023, 1026 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (whether employer
has bargained in good faith should be assessed under totality of circumstances); Continental Ins. Co.
v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1974) (conduct of negotiations as charade or sham, intending to
avoid reaching an agreement, amount to bad-faith bargaining and constitute unfair labor practice of
employer). In this context, a determination of failure to bargain in good faith requires an inquiry
into the state of mind or motives of the charged party and, thus, is often difficult to make. See
Continental In&, 495 F.2d at 84; R. GORMAN, supra note 66, at 399-401 discussing problems of
proving failure to bargain in good faith). For example, surface bargaining has been defined as "going through the motions of negotiating, without any real intent to reach an agreement." K-Mart
Corp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 704, 706 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Cox, The Duty to Bargain in GoodFaith,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1413 (1958)). If established, surface bargaining violates the NLRA's requirement to negotiate in good faith. Id. This type of behavior is often difficult to distinguish from
firm good faith bargaining and is therefore difficult to prove. See id.; see also, Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1977) (distinguishing from charade bargaining
requires drawing difficult inferences from conduct to motivation). Thus, many courts have applied a
totality of circumstances test. See ContinentalIn, 495 F.2d at 48 (determination must be founded
upon overall conduct and totality of circumstances). No single factor is essential to the application
of this concept; rather, surface bargaining is usually detected by a careful review of the employer's
overall bargaining conduct. Id.
Courts also apply a totality of circumstances test to determine whether a party has bargained
with a predetermined course not to reach an agreement. Id. Factors courts consider in the determination of good faith include an employer's failure to make counter proposals, see, eg., NLRB v.
Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 400 F.2d 565, 568-71 (8th Cir. 1968); Adrian Daily Telegram,
214 N.L.R.B. 1103, 1111 (1974), and delays or other evasive tactics, see, e.g., NLRB v. Milgo Indus.,
Inc., 567 F.2d 540, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 410 F.2d 462, 462
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gation to bargain in good faith. 295 For example, an employer may violate
section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing mandatory subjects of bargaining

without first fulfilling the obligation to bargain with the union over those
subjects.296
The prohibition against unilateral employer action fosters collective

bargaining both by preserving mandatory items for the bargaining table
and by protecting the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative. 2 97 Similarly, the specific purpose of the status quo doctrine is to

prevent management from undermining the union's bargaining authority. 298 The status quo doctrine is thus a logical extension of the prohibition against unilateral action regarding mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining.

The foundational policy of the labor exemption, to reconcile competing antitrust and labor policies, is clearly distinguishable from the policy designed to protect the status of the exclusive bargaining

representative. Limiting the scope of the labor exemption to the life of
the collective bargaining agreement is not inconsistent with the status

quo doctrine. More specifically, enabling the union to enjoin enforcement of unreasonable restraints after an agreement expires is not inconsistent with a doctrine designed to prevent management from
undermining the status of the bargaining representative. If the union has
indicated unambiguously that it no longer is interested in continuing the
challenged restraints, neither maintaining the status quo nor continuing
the labor exemption will foster collective bargaining or protect the
union's bargaining status.
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969). See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 66, at 401-07 (on
the placing of conditions as prerequisites to bargaining).
295. For example, information concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining is recognized as
necessary and relevant to the collective bargaining process, see General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d
1177, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1972), and an employer's obligation to furnish information of this nature is
well established. NLRB v. Acme Indus., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB, 626
F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152, 1165 (5th Cir. 1976);
GeneralElec. Co., 466 F.2d at 1183. Generally, an employer who refuses to provide a union with
such information, when requested in the course of bargaining, violates section 8(a)(5). See, e.g.,
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1982); Detroit Newspaper Printing
& Graphic Communications Union, Local 13 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
296. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962).
297. See, e.g., Katz, 369 U.S. at 747; NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217, 225
(1949).
298. See, eg., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960) (employer's
unilateral change "tends to subvert the union's position as the representative of the employees");
Leeds & Northrop Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1968) (employer's unilateral action
"would undermine the union's authority by disregarding its status as the representative of the
employees").
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In light of the underlying purpose of the status quo doctrine, the
owners' other argument supporting the continuation of the exemption,
that it would be inconsistent with federal labor policy to expose management to antitrust liability for maintaining the status quo, is also unpersuasive. An employer should not be permitted to use the status quo
doctrine to shield otherwise illegal provisions that the union no longer
desires. The fact that the restraint was previously subject to good faith
negotiations is relevant to an employer's obligation to maintain the status
quo; previous good-faith negotiations are not relevant to the application
or nonapplication of the labor exemption once the agreement has expired. Upon expiration of the agreement, an employer either should be
forced to comply with the antitrust laws or willing to negotiate away
benefits in return for the unreasonable restraint. The owners' argument
that such a result creates an unjustifiable shift in bargaining leverage is
difficult to accept. The union should have leverage to modify or eliminate an illegal restraint it determines is no longer in its best interest.
2. Exception to the Status Quo Doctrine. Even if one accepts the
owners' argument that the labor exemption is tied to the status quo doctrine, two exceptions to that doctrine undermine the owners' position in
the current dispute. If the challenged provisions fall within either of
these exceptions, they are beyond the scope of the status quo doctrine.
Obviously, the owners' argument that it would be inconsistent to impose
antitrust liability for provisions the owners are required to maintain is
irrelevant to provisions that the owners need not maintain.
First, an employer may, without violating the status quo doctrine,
abolish provisions in an expired agreement that involve preeminent rights
guaranteed by the NLRA, such as the right to engage or refrain from
engaging in concerted activities and the right to strike.299 Under this
exception, an employer can, upon expiration of the agreement, unilaterally change union security and dues check-off provisions, 3c0 as well as no
strike and arbitration provisions. 30 1 To support their position that the
restrictions on free agency do not fall within this exception to the status
quo doctrine, the owners cite authority that an employer must maintain
299. See, Southwestern Steel & Supply, Inc. v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 1111, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(waiver of union's statutory right to strike during the life of the collective-bargaining agreement is
not waiver "of the right to strike beyond the contract term").
300. Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1500, 1502 (1962),petition for enforcement denied and
cause remandedsub nom. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d
615 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964).
301. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960); Graphic Communications Union, Local No. 2 v. Chicago Tribune Co., 794 F.2d 1222, 1225
(7th Cir. 1986).
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wage provisions after an agreement expires. 30 2

30 3
The restrictions on free agency do have a direct impact on wages.

Unlike typical wage scales, however, these restrictions implicate preeminent rights guaranteed under the NLRA. The free agent system effec-

tively requires a waiver of the union's right as exclusive bargaining

34
representative to negotiate wages collectively. 0
Individual contract negotiations are an integral part of the NFL's
restrictions on free agency. Under article 15 of the 1982 agreement, a
free agent is entitled to negotiate an offer with a different team. The team
that owns the free agent's rights can either match the offer or receive

draft choice compensation, which depends upon the amount of the offer
negotiated with the new team. 305 Although the primary purpose of the
NLRA is to promote collective bargaining, 30 6 the League's free agent
system could not operate absent contract negotiations between individual

players and teams. Thus, whether the dispute involves eliminating (as in
1982)307 or altering the League's free-agent system (as in the current negotiations), 308 a system that authorizes individual contract negotiations
appears to fall within the preeminent rights exception to the status quo
doctrine.
Second, an employer's obligation to maintain the status quo does
not continue indefinitely. The status quo doctrine only requires an employer to continue prior conditions of employment until the parties reach
302. See, eg., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 744-46 (1962); NLRB v. General Time Corp. 650
F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1981).
303. The right of first refusal/compensation system requires the team signing a free agent to
compensate the player's previous team. In Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), the Eighth Circuit concluded that compensation under the Rozelle Rule
had an impact on salaries.
304. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the purpose
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .... " Under § 8(a), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees ... " Id. § 158(a)(5). In effect, an employer is
not entitled to bargain with any person other than the majority representative concerning wages,
hours, or terms and conditions of employment. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39
(1944).
305. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3 art. 15, § 12.
306. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) ("li]t is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining").
307. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
308. In the current dispute, the union wants to retain the system of individual player-team negotiations and eliminate the compensation requirements for veteran free agents. See supra notes 43-45
and accompanying text.
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impasse. 30 9 After bargaining in good faith to impasse, an employer is
free to implement unilateral changes as long as those changes are consis3 10
tent with the latest proposals offered to the union prior to impasse.
Recognizing the possibility that the parties had already reached or
would reach impasse, the NFL owners argue that the labor exemption
extends beyond the scope of the status quo doctrine and beyond impasse,
31 1
and runs as long as management chooses to maintain the status quo.
The owners' argue that the underlying policy of the status quo doctrine,
like the policy underlying the labor exemption, is to promote the collective bargaining process by fostering a non-coercive atmosphere conducive to serious negotiations.3 12 Continuing the terms of an expired
agreement beyond impasse is conducive to a stable bargaining environment. Although an employer at impasse may unilaterally change working conditions, impasse does not alter the policy considerations
underlying the status quo doctrine. Under the owners' interpretation, a
union that has agreed to a restraint may not challenge that restraint on
antitrust grounds as long as the owners decide to maintain the status
quo. Thus, an agreement to a particular unreasonable restraint for a finite period operates to waive, indefinitely or permanently, a party's rights
under the antitrust laws. In short, the players' rights under the antitrust
laws lie, after the agreement has expired, in the hands of the owners.
This interpretation is inconsistent with the requirements of bonafide, arm's-length negotiations which are a prerequisite to the labor exemption. 3 13 The requirement of arm's-length negotiations suggests that
there must be some quidpro quo between the parties. In other words, the
union must be strong enough to extract some benefits from management
in return for the concessions that it makes. In the absence of arm'slength bargaining, it has been held that the labor exemption does not
shield player restraints from antitrust attack. 3 14 Hence, if courts refuse
to immunize restraints contained in agreements over which the parties
failed to bargain in good faith, it seems unlikely that courts will protect
restraints which the union no longer desires, once the collective bargaining agreement has expired. Judicial reluctance to enforce restraints that
were in essence thrust upon a union suggests that an expired collective
bargaining agreement should not protect unwanted restraints that violate
antitrust laws.
309. Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 64-65 (1964).
310. Id. at 65.
311. See supra notes 285-98 and accompanying text; see also NBA Memorandum, supra note
228, at 37-39.
312. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
313. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
314. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
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Additionally, the owners' interpretation infringes upon one of the
most fundamental rights established under the NLRA: the parties' right
to establish through good faith negotiations the terms of their own agree316
ment. 3 15 This right necessarily incorporates the freedom to contract.
In fact, the freedom to contract is so fundamental that the parties may
agree in certain instances on unreasonable restraints of trade. 3 17 The
freedom to contract also enables the parties to determine the length of
their agreement.

Arguably, the application of the exemption after the agreement expires both undermines the bona-fide arm's-length negotiation prerequisite

and impairs the ability of the parties to determine the length of their
agreement. For example, union leaders might think that the cost to players of the right of first refusal/compensation system equals $x. The

union, then, might be willing to agree to such a system for five years, as it
did in 1977, in return for $5x or the equivalent thereof in other bene-

fits. 318 Immunizing this system from antitrust attack in year six, after the

expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, gives management a
benefit for which there was no bargained-for exchange. Had the union
anticipated this result, it would have demanded $5x + ($x)(P), where P

is the probability that no new collective bargaining agreement would be
3
reached by year six. 19
Finally, the owners' argument that the labor exemption survives the
agreement by virtue of their obligation to maintain the status quo is
clearly undermined, at least in this case, by the owners' recent unilateral

implementation of their latest free agency proposal. Regardless of
whether the owners had bargained to impasse over their new proposal,
315. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 150 n. 11 (1976), overruled, Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491 (1984); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S.
477, 488-89 (1960).
316. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing 95 WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE
LEGAL PROcEss 49-90 (1968)) (antitrust challenge to collective bargaining agreement would require
abrogating NLRA's commitment to freedom of contract).
317. See, eg., Wood, 809 F.2d at 961; McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198
(6th Cir. 1979); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 406 (D.D.C. 1986).
318. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (discussing union's concessions in 1977
negotiations).
319. Even if management continued in year six the benefits that it agreed to provide in the
expired agreement, this hypothetical suggests that continuation of the right of first refusal/compensation system in year six was not necessarily the product of good faith negotiations. The costs to
players of this system in year six might be greater than ($Ix)(P), perhaps because the League enters
into a new television agreement, expands, or undergoes other changes that affect the marginal revenue product of or utility an owner realizes from potential free agents. The union, at the time it
valued the costs of this system in each of the five years at $x, and decided to execute a five-year
agreement, may have contemplated a much greater value for the system in year six.
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and, therefore, had a right under the NLRA to implement that proposal,
it is unlikely that a court would conclude that the labor exemption continues even after the status quo has been altered. Such a conclusion presumably would permit management to unilaterally implement, with
immunity from the antitrust laws, an even more restrictive system.
V.

PROPER ACCOMMODATION OF COMPETING ANTITRUST AND
LABOR POLICIES

A.

Scope of the Labor Exemption in the Current Dispute

*The purpose of the labor exemption is to accommodate conflicting
policies under federal antitrust and labor laws. 320 To foster collective
bargaining, the courts have willingly subordinated antitrust policies and
immunized otherwise unlawful restraints contained in bona-fide arm'slength agreements. Thus, the parties are free to resolve their differences
over mandatory subjects through the bargaining process. Either party
may determine that agreeing to a restraint or bargaining away rights
under the antitrust laws, in return for certain benefits, is in its best interest. As long as the restraint primarily affects the parties to the agreement, their consent justifies immunization from the antitrust laws. 32 1 In
this context, the proper accommodation of the antitrust and labor laws
requires that the labor laws control.
The Eighth Circuit in Mackey applied this general policy of accommodation to the fact situation before it and determined that federal labor
policy was subordinate to the Sherman Act in situations where the challenged restraint was the product not of consent or arm's-length negotiations but resulted from a significant mismatch in relative bargaining
position. 32 2 Mackey, then, is relevant to the current dispute to the extent
that it reflects a proper accommodation of competing antitrust and labor
policies.
The New Jersey and Minnesota district courts failed to apply this
general policy of accommodation and, as a result, resolved the unionLeague disputes on the basis of rules that are inconsistent with the purpose of the labor exemption. 323 The courts mistakenly attempted to formulate a test that could be explained in terms of isolated, specific labor
policies. By focusing on specific policies, (such as the status quo doc320. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977) (availability of exemption "turns upon whether the relevant federal policy is deserving of preeminence over Federal antitrust policy").
321. Id. at 614.

322. Id. at 616.
323. Ironically, both courts articulated this policy of accommodation. See Powell v. NFL, 690
F. Supp. 812, 817 (D. Minn. 1988); Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987).
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trine), that contribute to the overall objective of the NLRA to foster collective bargaining, both courts failed to accommodate properly the
conflicting purposes of the federal antitrust and labor laws.
Application of the labor exemption is not appropriate just because
its application is consistent with a specific labor law policy. The Mackey
court, for example, withheld the exemption even though its application
324
was found to be consistent with two of the three prongs of its own test.
The labor exemption represents an accommodation between labor and
antitrust policies, rather than a reconciliation of the immunization of a
particular restraint with a single, specific federal labor law policy.
This is not to say that the NLRA's policy fostering collective bargaining should not be given preeminence over the antitrust laws. In
some situations, however, withholding the exemption will not impede the
bargaining process, or will not do so to the extent necessary to justify
application of the exemption. The current NFL-NFLPA dispute is an
example of such a situation.
During the negotiations following the expiration of the 1970, 1977
and 1982 agreements, the NFLPA used virtually every economic and
legal weapon at its disposal to eliminate League restrictions on free
agency. The players' economic weapons were not effective in the union's
negotiations with the owners. None of the strikes forced management to
capitulate to the union. 325 Instead, each strike crumbled after players
326
crossed picket lines, leaving the union bitter and divided.
The players' legal weapons also proved ineffective. Management refused to yield to the union's demands despite adverse antitrust decisions,
and NLRB proceedings had virtually no impact on management's positions at the bargaining table. The outcome of the disputes over the interpretation of section 17 of the 1977 collective bargaining agreement and
the exclusive rights provisions in the standard player contract exacerbated the effect of the NLRB's inability to vindicate the union's rights
327
under the NLRA.
More recently, the union's leverage suffered further damage by the
owners' willingness and ability to continue the 1987 season with replacement players during the players' strike.328 The free agency system implemented by the NFLMC on February 1, 1989, presumably undertaken to
improve the League's chances of prevailing at trial on the merits of the
324. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614-16.
325. In the negotiations for the 1982 agreement, the union was able to exact some concessions
from the owners. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 115-18, 130-48 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 121-22, 149-61 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
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NFLPA's antitrust action, does provide unrestricted freedom for those
not among their team's top thirty-seven players; yet, the benefits of this
system almost exclusively fall on marginal players and aging veterans
with large contracts. 329 With a League-wide employer turnover rate approximating twenty-five percent per year, a significant number of players
who did in fact change teams under the new system will likely be waived
out of the League by opening day, albeit by a different team. In short,
the union's use of economic and legal weapons has failed to produce any
significant change in the League's provisions restricting free agency. The
current provisions, at least for the top thirty-seven players on each team,
are every bit as restrictive as those condemned in earlier antitrust actions.
One way to view this one-sided course of events, of course, is to cite
the NLRA's policy of self-determination. The collective bargaining
framework mandated by Congress is designed to permit the parties to
negotiate their own agreement based on their respective bargaining
strengths. Thus, neither the Board nor the courts should be concerned
with the terms of the ultimate agreement. 330 The parties' relative bargaining positions are irrelevant to the application of the labor exemption,
to the extent that provisions in an unexpired agreement are the product
of arm's-length negotiations. A union, for example, should not be permitted to invalidate undesirable restraints contained in an unexpired
agreement simply because it has second thoughts concerning those restraints or makes a mistake in judgment or strategy during the negotiations. To permit a union to attack such restraints would undermine the
federal labor policy favoring collective bargaining by giving employers
''no assurances that they could enter into an agreement without exposing
themselves to an action for treble damages."' 33 x In effect, this approach
would subvert completely federal labor law in favor of antitrust policies,
3 32
a result clearly not intended by Congress or the courts.
The purpose of the NLRA, however, will not be realized where the
agreement reached is based not on consent, but on a significant mismatch
in relative bargaining positions. The requirement of good faith, arm'slength negotiations suggests that the union must be strong enough to
extract some concessions from management. At some point the parties'
relative bargaining positions are so unequal that the agreement is not the
product of arm's-length negotiations. In those cases such an agreement
329. See Supra Notes 47-54 and accompanying text (discusses League's new free agent system,
the alleged basis for the League's actions, and provides data indicating that players who changed
teams under new system did not survive long with their new team).
330. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 2, 20 (1987) ('T]he NLRA's concerned with
engineering an equitable bargaining process, not with the substantive terms of the agreement.").
331. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987).
332. Id.
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clearly fails to properly accommodate competing antitrust and labor
333
policies.
In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit determined that the challenged provisions were included in the 1970 agreement neither as a result of a mistake in judgment or strategy by the union, nor as a result of an acceptable
imbalance in bargaining leverage. Rather, the court found that the restraints resulted from an imbalance in bargaining strength so significant
334
that these restraints furthered neither antitrust nor labor law.
Mackey, then, suggests that the requirement of good faith, arm's-length
negotiations limits the extent to which a party with superior leverage can
impose conditions of employment on a weaker party.
The Eighth Circuit, of course, expressly declined to consider the significance of bargaining history to terms contained in an expired agreement. 335 Because the Rozelle Rule was not the product of arm's-length
negotiations, it was subject to antitrust attack prior to the expiration of
the 1970 agreement. Thus, the court was not forced to determine
whether the Rule would have been subject to antitrust attack after the
1970 agreement expired. Where the bargaining history between two parties reflects a significant mismatch in bargaining power, however, that
history is just as relevant to the prospective application of the exemption
to terms in an expired agreement as it is to terms in an unexpired (albeit
one-sided) agreement. Where a dominant party has historically dictated
conditions of employment, conditions which are neither in the other
party's best interest nor in accordance with the underlying policies of the
antitrust laws, and it appears that the same party will continue to dictate
similar conditions in the future, application of the exemption beyond the
term of an agreement fails to accommodate competing antitrust and labor policies. To the extent that bargaining history reflects the type of
imbalance recognized in Mackey, application of the exemption beyond
the agreement's term perpetuates the imbalance and invites recurrence of
the exact situation that the Mackey court condemned.
In the current dispute, no valid justification exists for applying the
labor exemption beyond the term of the collective bargaining agreement.
The imbalance in relative bargaining strengths during the early negotiations between the NFL and NFLPA recognized by the Eighth Circuit in
Mackey continues to characterize the union's bargaining relationship
with the League. The unique nature of the employment relationship in
professional sports has created an inherent mismatch in bargaining be333. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615-16 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977)
(NFLPA was too weak to engage in bona-fide bargaining).
334. Id. at 616.
335. See id.
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tween the NFL and NFLPA. 3 36 The entire bargaining history between
the parties reflects this mismatch. Application of the exemption beyond
the agreement will perpetuate this mismatch.
Similarly, withholding the exemption will not effectuate the purposes of the antitrust laws. 337 Two legislative exemptions have immunized certain anticompetitive conduct. Because of the inherently
cooperative nature of professional sports and the fact that the League's
product is jointly produced, 338 the courts have reviewed otherwise per se
violations of the antitrust laws under the more flexible rule of reason
standard. 339 The inherent mismatch in the parties' relative bargaining
strengths has enabled management to perpetuate anticompetitive player
restraints that were originally implemented unilaterally by the League
prior to the union's existence. Thus, the antitrust laws, partially applied,
have failed to preserve the level of competition among employers in professional sports that normally exists among employers in other unionized
industries.
Permitting the labor exemption to shield additional anticompetitive
conduct after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement will further permit the League to circumvent the antitrust laws. In effect, it will
completely eliminate application of the antitrust laws to player restraints.
Moreover, it will eliminate the one remaining weapon that the NFLPA
has at its disposal to counteract the League's ability to dictate and employ anticompetitive restraints, thereby further emasculating the union's
leverage at the bargaining table.
In the current dispute, any decision to continue immunizing otherwise illegal restraints beyond the term agreed to will neither advance the
purposes of federal antitrust and labor law nor accommodate competing
antitrust and labor policies. Rather, continuing to immunize the challenged restraints will only further reduce competition in the industry, a
result inconsistent with federal antitrust laws, without promoting the
policies of the NLRA. In fact, a judicial decision to continue immunizing these restraints is likely to undermine the policies of the Act.
The owners fail to explain why granting the exemption will not benefit them, by inflating their leverage or inducing them not to bargain,
more than withholding the exemption is likely to benefit the union. Yet,
absent the risk of antitrust liability, the owners will have no incentive to
bargain with the union over the restrictions on free agency. Because of
the lack of meaningful penalties under the NLRA, the NFL will incur no
336.
337.
338.
339.

See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

86-113 and accompanying text.
20-32 and accompanying text.
97-107 and accompanying text.
33-42 and accompanying text.
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costs by simply continuing to impose the current system on the
34°
players.
Within the context of the current NFL-NFLPA dispute, the proper
accommodation of federal antitrust and labor law requires that the labor
exemption expire simultaneously with the collective bargaining agreement. In this dispute, immediate application of the antitrust laws upon
expiration of the agreement will not undermine federal labor law. As
noted above,3 4 1 the parties in this dispute were free to negotiate in good
faith from the conclusion of the 1986 season until sometime after February 1, 1988 before potential free agents would accrue any damages under
the antitrust laws. Thus, the parties had over a year to resolve this dispute through the collective bargaining process without the risk of antitrust liability. The parties were unable to reach an agreement during that
time frame; the collective bargaining process had reached a standstill.
Perpetuating the exemption in this case completely negates the antitrust
laws without fostering collective bargaining. Thus no valid justification
exists for not furthering the purposes of the antitrust laws.
B. Additional Measures
1. Need for Other Measures. In the current NFL dispute, simultaneous expiration of the agreement and the labor exemption undoubtedly would have had an impact on the parties' relative leverage in
collective bargaining. At a minimum, such a result would have forced
the larties to engage in meaningful negotiations at an earlier time and, in
the absence of an agreement, precipitated a quicker resolution of the merits of the pending lawsuit. Thus, given the current structure of the professional sports industry, the simultaneous expiration of the exemption
and the agreement was the best accommodation of competing antitrust
and labor policies.
In a more general sense, however, the simultaneous expiration of the
exemption and the agreement would not necessarily have produced an
appropriate or desirable reconciliation of conflicting antitrust and labor
policies. Immediate expiration of the exemption would not necessarily
have eliminated the mismatch in relative bargaining strengths or produced an outcome that truly reflected good faith, arm's-length negotiations between the parties. Regardless of when the labor exemption
expires, the ultimate solution to the inherent mismatch in bargaining
strengths between the NFL and NFLPA is beyond the scope of the current dispute.340. See Lock, Employer Unfair LaborPractices, supra note 130, at 216.
341. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
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The following scenario illustrates this point. Assume that the Minnesota district court held that the exemption expired on August 31, 1987,
the day the 1982 agreement expired. Further assume either that the antitrust suit was resolved quickly on the merits in favor of the NFLPA, or
that management, in anticipation of an adverse decision on the merits,
negotiated a new agreement with the union containing few, if any, restrictions on free agency. The possibility still exists that the NFLPA's
victory would be a hollow one.
First, complete judicial victory would not guarantee an elimination
of the restrictions on free agency. A critical factor in the negotiations, of
course, would be the extent to which the costs associated with the labor
dispute between the NFL and NFLPA eroded player support for the
union,3 42 especially if management continued to insist upon restrictions
on free agency after the lawsuit as it did following the Mackey decision.
As the sequence of events following Mackey indicates, judicial victory
34 3
will not necessarily shift the balance of bargaining power to the union.
Second, given the economic structure and the employment relationships in the NFL, a new agreement providing for free agency might not
benefit the players. Arguably, the system of revenue sharing might naturally limit the bidding for free agents. As a group, the owners realize a
collective benefit from keeping salaries down. Good business judgment
would, in the absence of any economic reward for winning, discourage
bidding for expensive free agents. To the extent that natural economic
forces failed to restrict free agent bidding, the owners would have the
same economic incentive to artificially minimize free agent movement
through collusion, conduct that would be difficult to prove in an antitrust
suit or arbitration proceeding since the owners naturally lack incentive to
344
bid for free agents under the League's system of revenue sharing.
342. For a discussion of the impact of unfair labor practices within the context of professional
sports, see Lock, Employer Unfair Labor Practices,supra note 130.
343. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
344. Free agency has existed in Major League Baseball (MLB) since the Messersmith-McNally
arbitration decision in December, 1975. In re Arbitration Between the Twelve Clubs Comprising
the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the Twelve Clubs Comprising the American
League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players Association, Decision
No. 29, Grievance Nos. 75-27 and 75-28 (Dec. 23, 1975) (Seitz, Arb.). In two recent arbitration
cases the arbitrator found that MLB owners colluded to eliminate intra-league bidding for free
agents: In the Matter of the Arbitration between MLBPA and the Twenty-Six Major League Baseball Clubs, Grievance No. 86-2, Sept. 21, 1987; In the Matter of the Arbitration between MLBPA of
the Twenty-Six Major League Baseball Clubs, Grievance No. 87-3, Aug. 31, 1988. However, collusion would arguably be easier to establish in MLB than in the NFL. MLB teams do not share a
significant portion of team revenues: gate receipts are split on an 80%-20% basis, Major League
Baseball Constitution, art. 13. Each team with the exception of the "superstation" teams (Atlanta
Braves, Chicago Cubs, and New York Mets), keeps 100% of its non-network television revenues.
Telephone conversation with Don Gibson, MLB Broadcasting Dep't (Sept. 9, 1989) (unlike NFL,
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Perhaps most significantly, an antitrust victory would not necessarily alter the inherent mismatch in leverage at the bargaining table. The
players still would possess the same short careers, lack of job security,
and limited alternative job opportunities that currently undermine the
union's bargaining leverage. Thus, regardless of how little bidding for
free agents actually occurred, the owners might be willing to accept free
agency only in exchange for the elimination of other benefits such as severance pay, injury protection, or a pension and a minimum wage based
on seniority. In other words, because management still would possess its
inherently stronger position at the bargaining table, it would retain the
ability to dictate the terms of a new agreement.
Free agency, in fact, could result in a less equitable allocation of
industry revenues between management and the players or a less equitable allocation of revenues among players. As a class, NFL players do not
possess homogeneous skills. As noted above, 345 different bargaining demands affect different players differently: superstars would benefit from
competitive bidding, while marginal players would probably benefit from
higher minimum salaries, greater job protection and greater pension benefits. Even if the superstars benefit from free agency, the majority of
players might fare less well than under the old system because of the
"give backs" management would demand at the bargaining table in exchange for free agency.
The above scenario suggests that immediate expiration of the exemption may reduce, but would not eliminate, the inherent mismatch in
bargaining power between the owners and NFLPA. Within the context
of the NFL, the proper accommodation of competing antitrust and labor
policies requires more than just the simultaneous expiration of the agreement and the labor exemption. Possible additional measures designed to
achieve the proper accommodation of labor and antitrust policies are
suggested below. These measures give a different perspective to the labor
exemption issue in the current dispute and illustrate that the scope of the
labor exemption is just one factor that has helped to shape the overall
bargaining relationship between the owners and NFLPA.

baseball owners do not give league exclusive rights, but retain right to negotiate non-network contracts). Teams are rewarded economically for winning their division and participating in play-off
and World Series competition, Major League Baseball Rules, Rule 45. In addition, MLB teams play
before less than capacity crowds. To the extent that winning increases fan interest, MLB owners
have an economic incentive to bid on high-priced free agents to improve their teams. NFL owners
do not have the same economic incentive to win, and they could explain their failure to bid on free
agents as individual economic decisionmaking, rather than collusion.
345. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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2. Elimination of Antitrust Exemptions. Aside from the fact that
the NLRA was designed for industrial employers and employees, the Act
is typically more effective outside of professional sports at least in part
because of the presence of competition in other industries. Competition
does not exist in the NFL. The pronounced imbalance in bargaining
strengths in the NFL is due partly to the lack of inter- and intra-league
competition for players. The lack of external competition for employees
deprives individual players of the opportunity to defect, or threaten to
defect, to another employer (league) in the event that the union is unable
to negotiate an acceptable collective bargaining agreement or the player
is unable to reach an agreement with his team. This lack of external
competition, coupled with the NFL's internal restrictions on competition
for players, frequently places individual players in a "take it or leave it"
346
situation in individual negotiations.
The union's leverage in collective bargaining is, of course, a function
of the leverage of individual players. Thus the union's leverage is inherently limited by the nature of the skills possessed by its bargaining unit
employees. Strikes and holdouts jeopardize a disproportionate percentage of career earning potential for players with short careers and, in
many cases, few alternative career opportunities. The lack of competition further limits the players' ability to withstand a strike and, consequently, the union's leverage at the bargaining table. With no competing
league, most players have no legitimate alternative job opportunity and
thus, are unlikely to outlast management in a labor dispute.
Moreover, because of the lack of competition, the strike, as a
weapon to force management to concede to the union's demands, does
not carry the same consequences for employers in professional sports as
it does for employers in other industries. The 1987 NFL strike illustrates
this point. With no competing league, the networks televised the replacement games, and the owners could offset at least part of the shortfall in
gate receipts with the dramatic decrease in payroll expense associated
347
with fielding replacement rather than regular players.
Admittedly, management suffered significant losses during past
players' strikes, and a future work stoppage may disrupt the owners'
short-term revenue flow. Regardless of any short-term losses, however,
the owners appear immune from the permanent or long term losses associated with the loss of market share. The absence of a competing league
prevents the loss of market share to a competitor and, although the
League has concerns over the negative impact of strikes on fan interest,
346. See, e.g., North DallasForty (Paramount 1979) (story of "washed up" player forced to take
drugs in order to stay on team).
347. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
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history shows that NFL fans, with no substitute product, are willing to
tolerate labor disputes and even an inferior product. The attendance in
1983, after the players' strike, was eighty-seven percent of capacity. 348 In
1987, many fans attended the replacement games and, when the walkout
ended, fans seemed to forget the strike ever took place. Few employers
in other industries could respond to a work stoppage by hiring inferior
employees and producing an inferior product without the fear of losing
market share and employees to a competitor. Few other employers or
multi-employer bargaining units enjoy the type of monopoly and monopsony power enjoyed by the NFL owners. Not surprisingly, few unions
face the same disadvantages at the bargaining table as the NFLPA.
Two antitrust exemptions granted by Congress have contributed to
the elimination of inter- and intra-league competition: the exemption au3 49
thorizing the package sale of the NFL's television rights to its games,
and the exemption authorizing the NFL-AFL merger. 350 In anticipation
of new sources of revenue not covered by current league-wide revenue
sharing arrangements, the NFL recently proposed additional legislation
to prevent any future cracks in its monolith. The proposed legislation
would exempt from the antitrust laws League rules controlling the movement of franchises, as well as League-wide revenue sharing arrangements
351
for sky boxes and future non-network television revenue.
One way to reduce the imbalance in bargaining leverage in the NFL
would be to force the League to operate, at least partially, in a competitive environment. Repealing either or both of the existing antitrust exemptions and denying the legislation currently proposed by the League
would ensure a more competitive environment. The scope of the labor
exemption is a more significant issue in the NFL than in other industries
because of the cumulative impact of other exemptions on the industry.
The purpose of the labor exemption is to foster collective bargaining, not
to destroy the union's leverage at the bargaining table. Eliminating one
or both of the existing exemptions and denying any additional exemp35 2 It
tions would foster intra- and inter-league competition for players.
would create more of a free market so that the labor exemption would
have roughly the same impact on collective bargaining in the NFL as it
348. OFIMCIAL 1987 NFL RECORD AND FACT BOOK (1987).

349. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
350. Id.
351. See, e.g., S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced at 131 CONG. REC. S633 (1985) (Sen.
Deconcini introduces bill to clarify application of federal antitrust laws to professional sports industry); see also S. 259, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S467-71 (1985) (Sen. Eagleton introduces
bill to stabilize relationship of professional sports teams and host communities).
352. While eliminating the exemptions that allowed the NFL-AFL merger to take place could
conceivably reestablish inter-league competition, such a proposal is simply not feasible today.
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does in other industries. 353
a. The television exemption. The 1961 legislation permitting the
League to sell its television rights in a package effectively sanctioned the
pro rata allocation of network television revenue.3 5 4 Whatever the impact this arrangement had on the overall allocation of industry revenues
in 1961, before television became a major force in the industry, its impact
in 1989 cannot be overstated. Television revenues now constitute a
larger source of revenue than gate receipts. Under the League's current,
three-year television agreement, each NFL team will receive approximately $17 million per year, regardless of its record or the number of
times it appears on television.3 55 Coupled with the division of gate receipts, which are shared between the home and visiting team on a 60%40% basis, the pro rata division of television revenues undoubtedly
dampens the enthusiasm for bidding on expensive free agents, even if the
League agreed to such an intra-league system at the bargaining table.
Repealing the exemption authorizing package arrangements and the
sharing of television revenues clearly would increase a team's incentive to
win and to bid on expensive free agents. Although the NBA and Major
League Baseball (MLB) share network television revenues, those leagues
do not negotiate away the exclusive rights to their games to network television. As a result, individual franchises are free to contract with nonnetwork and local or regional cable stations.35 6 The revenue generated
from these sources is generally not shared.3 57 Winning undoubtedly increases viewers, cable subscribers, and ultimately advertising revenues,
which in turn increases the winning team's non-network television revenue. Thus, NBA and MLB teams have an economic incentive to win,
due in part to the fact that a larger percentage of league revenues are
353. In other industries, arrangements involving employers and other employers or sellers of
products are subject to the antitrust laws. In other words, horizontal and vertical arrangements, i.e.,
arrangements not between employers and employees, are not normally exempt or immune from
antitrust attack.
354. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961). By selling its games in a package, the League would receive a
lump sum payment from the networks and distributing this by any formula other than a pro rata
allocation would be problematic (since the Kansas City Chiefs could argue, for example, that if there

was no team for the New York Jets to play then there would be no television contract).
355. See Zimmerman, Time to Light a Fire, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 11, 1989, at 28, 30.
356. Unlike the NFL, MLB clubs do not give the Commissioner exclusive rights to negotiate
contracts over their games, but only grant authority with respect to network contracts. Telephone
conversation with Don Gibson, MLB Broadcasting Dep't (Sept. 9, 1989). Thus, individual
franchises are free to negotiate for non-network broadcasting.
357. The one exception to the practice of not sharing non-network revenues exists in MLB where
the "superstation" teams (the Atlanta Braves, Chicago Cubs, and New York Mets) make larger than
pro rata contributions to the players' pension fund. Id.
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unshared. Presumably, NFL teams also would have a greater incentive
to win if television revenues were not shared on a pro rata basis.
Is it feasible to repeal the television antitrust exemption? In the absence of other measures to ensure the League's stability, repeal of the
legislation authorizing the package sale of the League's television rights
is probably not a realistic solution. Undoubtedly, the NFL would argue
that the elimination of a pro rata distribution of network television revenues would place teams in small markets at a tremendous economic disadvantage and ultimately lead to the type of imbalance in team strengths
that could jeopardize the viability of the League. 358 However, the imbalance in team strengths, which the NFL fears is an inevitable product of
free agency or any other system providing an incentive to win, has not
materialized in the NBA or MLB. With the single exception of the
NBA's Los Angeles Lakers, teams in large markets have not consistently
dominated divisional races or championship series. Nonetheless, NFL
management could make a plausible argument that the elimination of the
pro rata distribution of network television revenues in conjunction with
an intra-league system providing for the movement of free agents would
make it impossible for teams in small markets such as Green Bay and
Kansas City to compete with teams in large markets.
Even assuming that large market franchises would dominate the
NFL in the event that television revenues were not distributed pro rata,
various measures could be adopted to prevent this type of imbalance
from occurring. For example, the League could adopt a salary cap to
control the amount of money each team could spend on salaries, or limit
the number of free agents any single team could sign per year. The
NBA, which operates franchises in Portland, San Antonio, Sacramento,
and Salt Lake City, adopted this measure. 359 Alternatively, the League
could require teams in large markets to subsidize teams in small markets.
MLB has, to a limited extent, followed this strategy. For instance,
"Superstation" teams are required to contribute a larger than pro rata
360
share to the players' pension fund.
Finally, the League could eliminate the restrictions on the movement of franchises. Presumably, teams in small markets that were unable to compete for players would gravitate to larger markets to
maximize their revenues, unless they were subsidized by their large-city
sister clubs. Theoretically, the marginal revenue products of all
358. See supra text and notes accompanying notes 33-38.
359. See Memorandum of Understanding between NBA and NBPA, which amended the 1976
Robertson Settlement Agreement (Apr. 18, 1983).
360. See supra note 356.
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franchises would ultimately be equal. 361 Of course, the result might be a
league with three franchises in Los Angeles, New York and Chicago, and
none in Kansas City, Cincinnati, or Green Bay-a result inconsistent
with the NFL's apparent desire for geographical dispersion.
A more moderate solution would be to amend the current exemption to permit the League to package its television rights only if the arrangement was non-exclusive. In other words, Congress could force the
League to negotiate a network contract, like the NBA and MLB network
arrangements, that would permit individual teams to negotiate individual, non-network television arrangements. Perhaps the most feasible solution would permit the package sale of exclusive television rights, but
require the League to designate a portion of the revenue generated by
network television as a playoff pool to be distributed to those teams that
are eligible for post-season play. 362 Any system that rewarded teams for
winning could potentially increase intra-league competition for players.
The predicted advantage to teams in large markets could be offset or
minimized by those measures suggested above: a salary cap, a limit on
the number of free agents a team could sign, or elimination of restrictions
on teams movement.
b. The merger exemption. In 1966, Congress enacted legislation
sanctioning the merger between the NFL and AFL. The merger was
great for the NFL and AFL. The two leagues had become involved in a
bidding war for players which had driven salaries up to 67% of gross
revenues. From an economic standpoint, the merger was disastrous for
players. The merger completely eliminated the competition for players,
and by 1980 salaries had declined to approximately 30% of league
363
revenues.
Although two additional competitors, the WFL and USFL, have
since attempted to enter the market, 364 neither league was capable of
overcoming the enormous capital investment required to compete with
the NFL. In the 1960s, the NFL had franchises in 12 cities and received
a relatively small amount of money from its television arrangement with
one network. Numerous markets capable of supporting professional
361. See generally P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 190 (1970) (discussing marginal revenue).
362. As it approached the negotiations in 1987, the NFLPA proposed that a League-wide playoff pool of money be established to reward the owner who wins. See NFLPA, GAME PLAN '87,
BLUEPRINT OF PRIORITIES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 1987, at 11 (1986).
363. After the AFL-NFL merger, the percentage decreased to 42% in 1972 and 30% in 1980.
WHY A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS, supra note 107, at 36.

364. The WFL played two seasons (1974-75). The USFL played three seasons (1983-85) before
it ceased play.
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football and two networks were available to the AFL. While AFL owners undoubtedly lost money in the league's early years, they certainly did

not face the same market power of the NFL in the 1960s which the WFL
and USFL faced in the 1970s and 1980s. The NFL is currently in 26
markets and has a contractual arrangement with the three networks as

well as ESPN, the national cable all-sports network. As the USFL discovered in the 1980s, the capital required to enter the market for profes-

sional football and legitimately compete with the NFL had become a
barrier to entry. The NFL, partly because of the NFL-AFL merger and
the League's three network television arrangement, has acquired an insurmountable degree of market power.
The tremendous mismatch in bargaining strengths between the NFL

and NFLPA is due to the cumulative effect of the lack of intra- and interleague competition for player service. Certainly the right of first refusal/
compensation system demanded by management at the bargaining table

would be less onerous if inter-league competition for players existed. The
dramatic increase in NFL salaries between 1982 and 1985 illustrates this
point.3 65 The rise in salaries was a function of the competition for players between the NFL and USFL that existed during that period.
Prior to the NFL-AFL merger, each league conducted its own draft
and they had no inter-league arrangement preventing a team in one

league from approaching a player from a team in another league upon
the expiration of the player's contract. In other words, rookies and veterans were able to negotiate with one team in each league. Thus, repealing the AFL-NFL merger in effect would create partial free agency,
366
giving players an opportunity to negotiate with at least two teams.
365. In 1982, the year before the USFL began operations, the average NFL salary was approximately $100,000. By 1985, the average NFL salary was approximately $200,000. Telephone conversation with NFLPA Research Dep't (Sept. 5, 1989).
366. Admittedly, repealing the AFL-NFL merger exemption would not necessarily result in
competition for player services similar to that which followed the formation of the AFL, WFL, and
USFL. The teams in those leagues played before less-than-capacity crowds and had low television
ratings and, therefore, had an economic incentive to sign free agents. The competition created by
teams in those leagues was a function of their attempt to increase gate receipts and build market
share. Attempts to sign highly visible, high-priced stars were presumably based on a belief that the
marginal revenue product of high-priced stars would exceed the marginal costs of signing those
players.
At the same time, the NFL had an economic incentive to engage in a bidding war for players
with the new leagues. The more quality players the new leagues acquired, the longer they could
survive and the more likely that they could produce a quality product. Theoretically, for example,
the USFL ultimately could produce a product that equalled or exceeded the NFL's product. Competition for players then would have become an industry constant and, in the absence of another
merger, placed permanent upward pressure on player salaries. By competing for players, the NFL
maintained its superiority over the USFL in the short run and, in the long run, made the cost of
competing with the NFL prohibitive. In other words, the NFL had an economic incentive to absorb
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3. Amendment to NLRA. Another way to reduce the imbalance
in bargaining strengths would be to amend the National Labor Relations

Act as it applies to the professional sports industry. The Act's current
procedures simply cannot accommodate the needs of employees in an
industry such as professional sports where careers are short and employment is seasonal. Although the NLRB has issued complaints on numerous unfair labor practice charges filed by the NFLPA, few of those
charges were resolved in a timely manner. Within the context of collective bargaining, delays in Board procedures frequently undermine the

union's bargaining position and thereby affect the terms of the ultimate
agreement. New procedures to expedite the resolution of unfair labor
practice charges, especially those committed during a strike or negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, would minimize the ero-

sion of union support which is likely to accompany continuous and
367
unremedied misconduct by the owners.
Section 100) of the Act, 368 a provision designed to provide injunc-

tive relief for victims of unfair labor practices pending resolution by the
Board of the associated charges, should be applied more liberally within

the context of professional sports. Section 10(j) was enacted because
Congress was aware that the delay in Board procedures sometimes rendered the Board unable to correct unfair labor practices until after the

victim had suffered irreparable harm. 369 Thus, section 100) is critical to
employees in industries such as professional sports where careers are

short or employment is seasonal, as well as in any other circumstances in
the short-run costs associated with the competition for players in order to avoid the long-term costs
of a permanent competitor in the marketplace or an involuntary merger.
That same economic incentive to compete would not necessarily exist if Congress separated the
AFL and NFC. The two leagues would have little economic incentive to compete if each league
maintained an intra-league system of revenue sharing and continued to enjoy capacity crowds and
stable television ratings. In such an environment, the marginal cost of signing high quality free
agents would exceed the marginal revenue product of such players. Nonetheless, the possibility
would exist that some owners would realize more utility from winning than maximizing their profits
and, thus, would bid for players on teams in the other league to improve their own team.
367. See Lock, Employer Unfair LaborPractices,supra note 130, at 224-25 (advocating accelerated procedures for processing NLRB complaints filed by unions)
368. 29 U.S.C. § 1606) (1982).
369. See Lock, Employer UnfairLabor Practices,supra note 130, at 190 n.6.
The Senate Report on Section 10j) alluded to the potential problem created by the Board's slow
procedures. S. REP. No. 105, 80TH CONG., 1ST SEss. 8, 27 (1947), reprintedin NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 407-14, 433 (1947). Acknowledging that the Board was often unable to correct unfair labor practices until the innocent
party had already suffered substantial injury, the report explained: "It has sometimes been possible
for persons violating the act to accomplish their unlawful objective before being placed under any
legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to restore or preserve the status quo
pending litigation." Id. at 27, reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AcT, at 433.
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which resort to normal Board procedures would reduce significantly the
ability of the Board to remedy in a meaningful way an unfair labor practice. Although section 10() is viewed by the Board and courts as an
extraordinary remedy,37 0 it was enacted to address the type of extraordinary situation that is an inevitable by-product of the unique bargaining
3 71
relationship in professional sports.
Substantive changes in the NLRA to reflect the unique nature of the
professional sports industry also would further the underlying purposes
of the Act. For example, the same standard or test for discriminatory
discharge applied in an industrial setting, where employees can be evaluated on an objective basis, realistically cannot be applied to employees
who because of the unique nature of their employment relationship, are
employed by employers who retain sole discretion to terminate employ372
ees for lack of skill.
Similarly, the widespread exposure of professional sports should

affect the scope of the owners' obligation to disclose profit and loss information.3 73 "Inability to pay" statements 374 made away from the bargain370. Section 10(j) has been used sparingly by the Board and the courts. The Board has historically restricted its use of section 10(j), exercising its discretion under that provision "not as a broad
sword, but as a scalpel, ever mindful of the dangers inherent in conducting labor management relations by way of injunction." Lock, supra note 130, at 190 n.6 (quoting address by Board Chairman
Frank W. McCulloch before the Eighth Annual Joint Industrial Relations Conference, Michigan
State University (April 19, 1962), reprintedin 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 74, 83 (1962)).
Although the Board has, since 1962, expanded its use of section 10(j), it has continued to limit
its requests for section 100) relief to extraordinary situations. See, e.g., Note, Section 100) of the
NationalLaborRelationsAct: A Legislative,Administrative and JudicialLook at a Potentially Effective (But Seldom Used) Remedy, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1021, 1026 n.5 (1978). The courts also
consider section 100) an extraordinary remedy. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter ex
rel NLRB, 385 F.2d 265, 272 (8th Cir. 1967) (section 100) reserved for serious and extraordinary
set of circumstances).
371. See Lock, Employee Unfair Labor Practices,supra note 130, at 190 n.6.
372. NLRB v. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enf'd, 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir,
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
373. An employer normally will not have to disclose information regarding such matters as executive salaries, company profits, and detailed breakdowns of company expenses. The union must
show a specific need, evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., United Furniture Workers of
America v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 880, 882-83 (4th Cir. 1967) (employer not required to turn over profit
data, even though the employee's Christmas bonus was calculated as a percentage of profits, because
nondisclosure would not impede bargaining); see also R. GORMAN, supra note 66, at 413 (company's
financial data need not be disclosed because it is presumptively irrelevant, absent a company claim of
poverty).
374. Although employers normally need not disclose profit and loss information, an employer
will be required to disclose, upon request, information to substantiate claims of financial inability to
meet the union's bargaining demands. "Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made
by either bargainer should be honest claims," including claims of inability to pay an increase in
wages. "If such an argument is important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is
important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy." NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149, 152-53 (1956). During the 1981 negotiation between the Major League Baseball Players Associ-
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ing table are more likely to reach employees in an industry such as the
NFL, where statements by team owners are reported on a regular basis,
than in other industries that are not the daily focus of national media
attention. Statements by the owner of the Dallas Cowboys, for example,
that the union's demands, if accepted by management, will jeopardize the
financial stability of the League are certain to reach players in Dallas as
well as other NFL cities, regardless of whether the owner is a member of
the management council or the statements are made to a local reporter in
Dallas. In this context, the owners should be required to provide substantiating financial information to support such assertions.
The unique nature of employee skills in professional sports also requires a broader scope of mandatory bargaining than is required in the
normal industrial setting. Employers in all industries have an obligation
to bargain over matters involving "wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment. ' 375 Excluded from the scope of mandatory
bargaining are various matters presumed to be within an employer's entrepreneurial prerogative. Thus, employers normally have the right to
unilaterally implement decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital, the basic scope and direction of the enterprise, and advertising expenditures. 376 Similarly, product design decisions normally have
too remote and speculative an impact on conditions of employment to
377
fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining.
Despite the merit of excluding product design decisions from the
scope of mandatory bargaining in the normal industrial setting, this limitation conflicts with the purpose of the NLRA when the employees' performance is the marketed product. 378 For example, NFL owners have
argued consistently that decisions involving rule changes 379 and playing
ation (MLBPA) and the Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee (MLBPRC) over the
issue of free agent compensation, several owners made away-from-the-table statements picked up by
the press indicating that the existing system of free agency and the associated escalation of player
salaries was threatening the financial viability of professional baseball. The MLBPA requested financial information to substantiate the claim. When the MLBPRC refused to disclose the requested
information, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge and asked the Board to seek section 10(0)
relief. Silvermann ex rel. NLRB v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., 516 F. Supp
588, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
375. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
376. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 224 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981) ("[I]n establishing
what issues must be submitted to the process of bargaining, Congress had no expectation that the
elected union representative would become an equal partner in the running of the business ... .
377. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
378. See Lock, The Legality Under the NLRA of Attempts by NFL Owners to UnilaterallyImplement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1987).
379. See, e.g., NFLMC and Constituent Member Clubs of the NFL and NFLPA (NFLMC II),
at 27-32, NLRB Case No. 13379 (June 30, 1976) (overtime and punt rules).
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surfaces 38 0 are essentially product design decisions. Yet, in professional

sports rule changes and playing surfaces invariably affect the safety of

players. 381 The NLRB and courts have held that safety concerns are

conditions of employment within the meaning of the NLRA and, accordingly, are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. 382 Until now, the
Board and courts have addressed this inherent conflict on an ad hoc
basis.
Finally, the most effective way to effectuate the purposes of the
NLRA is to adopt a system of fines or penalties for violations of the Act's
unfair labor practice provisions. The Act currently exerts little influence
on the parties' conduct during collective bargaining. Even when the
Board scheduled hearings and acted swiftly to resolve a particular unfair

labor practice charge, it was incapable of vindicating the NFLPA's
rights. Board sanctions are not punitive; they are simply designed to
remedy violations of the Act. 38 3 Although the Board ultimately may be
able to eliminate the unlawful conduct, the Act contains no provisions
either to undo the benefit that a violator may have derived from the un-

lawful conduct or to penalize the wrongdoer. 384 Indeed, most of the
NFLPA's unfair labor practice charges resolved by the Board resulted in

a simple cease and desist order.385 Not surprisingly, in many situations
NFL owners frequently have an economic incentive to commit unfair
386
labor practices.

The incentive for management to violate the unfair labor practice
provisions of the Act is particularly high in the professional sports indus-

try. Because professional athletes have short careers, minimal job security and seasonal opportunities for employment, athletes are extremely

vulnerable to violations of the Act committed by their employers. 387
During negotiations for a new agreement and especially during a work
380. National Football League Mgmt. Council and Constituent Member Clubs of the National
Football League and National Football League Player's Ass'n (NFLMC I), 203 N.L.R.B. 958, 958
(1973) (installation of artificial turf).
381. See id. at 962.
382. See, eg., Miller Brewing Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 831, 832 (1967), enforced 408 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.
1969); see also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("what safety practices are observed" included among conditions of employment),
383. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
384. The remedy for most unfair labor practices is a cease and desist order. Id. The Act does,
however, provide for reinstatement and back pay for employees wrongfully discharged because of
their union activities. Id.
385. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
386. See generally Skelton, Economic Analysis of the Costs and Benefits ofEmployer Unfair La.
bor Practices, 59 N.C.L. REV. 167 (1980) (cost-benefit analysis frequently makes employer unfair
labor practices attractive).
387. The impact of unfair labor practices on professional athletes is discussed in Lock, Employer
Unfair Labor Practices,supra note 130.
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stoppage, employer misconduct, if uncorrected, 38 8 in all likelihood will
gradually erode player support for the union and ultimately affect the
terms of the agreement between the parties. 38 9 In this respect, a violation
of the Act becomes a weapon of abuse for management.
Amending the substantive provisions of the Act undoubtedly would
result in a more predictable and consistent application of the Act within
the context of professional sports and, depending on the amendments,
could bring a wider range of management conduct within the scope of

the Act's unfair labor practice provisions. Yet, unless Congress also
amended the remedies under the Act, these amendments would have little impact on management's conduct. Management would have more
occasion but no less incentive to violate the Act.
One way to eliminate management's incentive to commit unfair la-

bor practices is to fine violators of the Act. The fine should be large
388. Presumably, the injurious effects of employer misconduct will increase the longer the misconduct is allowed to continue. See Note, The Proprietyof Section 100) BargainingOrdersin Gissel
Situations, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 112, 129-31 (1983).
389. An employer's refusal to bargain or other misconduct, if allowed to continue, may gradually erode employee support for the union. See Note, supra note 387, at 119. During a union organizational drive, an employer's unlawful conduct may reduce the chance of unionization. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-11 & n.31 (1969) (noting that employer's unfair
labor practices tended to preclude a fair union election). In situations where a union has already
been certified, an erosion of employee support can impair that union's bargaining leverage. The
erosion might prevent a union from using the threat of a strike as leverage during negotiations. See
Note, supra note 387, at 133. Gradual erosion may further weaken the union's position as collective
bargaining proceeds and ultimately affect the concessions it can obtain from management. As the
court in International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 950 (1970), stated:
Employee interest in a union can wane quickly as working conditions remain apparently
unaffected by the union or collective bargaining. When the company is finally ordered to
bargain with the union some years later, the union may find that it represents only a small
fraction of the employees. Thus, the employer may reap a ... benefit from his original
refusal to comply with the law: he may continue to enjoy lower labor expenses after the
order to bargain either because the union is gone or because it is too weak to bargain
effectively.
426 F.2d at 1249. (citations omitted). See also Frank Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944)
(employer's refusal to bargain can eventually cause irreparable harm by deflating morale of the employees and discouraging union membership).
Professional athletes are especially vulnerable to employer unfair labor practices because they
have short careers and little job security. See H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss. 535
(1977) (NFLPA's proposed amendments to section 10(j)). Ed Garvey, executive director of the
NFLPA, proposed that section 10j) be amended as follows:
that whenever it is charged that any person has engaged:in an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)-(5) of the Act and the unfair labor practice affects employees (1) in an occupation in which the average career length is short or employment opportunities are seasonal, or (2) in other circumstances in which recourse to normal Board
processes would significantly reduce the ability of the Board to meaningfully remedy the
unfair labor practice, the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be given priority
over all other cases except cases of like character and cases arising under Section 10() of
the Act ....

414
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enough, depending on the severity and frequency of the misconduct, to
deter unlawful behavior. In other words, the fine should be large enough
so that management is at least indifferent between violating and comply390
ing with the Act.

4. Recommended Solution.

The application of federal antitrust

and labor law within the context of professional sports has failed to ad-

vance the underlying objectives of either antitrust or labor law. In the
NFL, for example, two legislative exemptions, enacted prior to the formation of the NFLPA, permitted the package sale of the NFL's television rights and the NFL's merger with a viable competitor. The labor
exemption has immunized anticompetitive player restraints which have

evolved through an inherent mismatch in relative bargaining strength be390. Stated differently, the marginal cost of violating the Act should be greater than or equal to
marginal benefits derived from the violation. E. MANSFIELD, MICRO-ECONOMICS, THEORY AND
APPLICATION ch. 7 (1985). Perhaps the most drastic solution to the problems associated with the
lack of competition and the unique employment relationship in professional sports would be to establish an administrative agency to regulate the entire industry. In the absence of complete deregulation, the industry needs a more comprehensive regulatory scheme. Conceivably Congress could
exempt the entire professional sports industry from federal antitrust and labor law and establish an
agency to oversee the nature of the employer-employee relationship and determine the desirable
degree of competition in the industry.
The agency could be staffed with people familiar with the industry, economists to analyze the
impact of various measures currently presumed to be necessary for the survival of the leagues, and
statisticians to chart trends and recommend changes based on those trends. The agency could, if the
industry was exempt from the antitrust laws, process and resolve disputes over various restraints of
trade or, if the industry was not exempt from the antitrust laws, issue advisory opinions and recommendations based on its perception of the legality or illegality of the practice in question.
Like the NLRB, the agency also could develop rules concerning collective bargaining, investigate and prosecute violations of these rules, and process grievances in accordance with the procedures agreed to by the parties. These rules and procedures would be tailored to meet the unique
needs of the parties and, presumably, would ensure that conditions of employment in the industry
were not based entirely on strength or bargaining leverage. To avoid the disruption and adverse
economic impact of strikes, the agency could assume the role of mediator or even arbitrator in
collective bargaining disputes that reached impasse and were likely to result in a work stoppage.
In addition to ensuring compliance with rules governing collective bargaining, the agency also
would be able to protect the interests of other constituencies, such as fans, stadium authorities,
municipalities, and non-network television. These constituencies are affected by current league practices and the labor strife that has plagued the industry, but are not represented in the current scheme
of league rules, random and inconsistent antitrust decisions, and general labor statutes. The agency
could adopt or approve rules governing leasing and stadium arrangements, the movement of
franchises, and expansion to prevent the types of situations that developed in Philadelphia and Indianapolis when the Eagles and Colts brought those cities to their respective knees. The City of Philadelphia paid an enormous ransom to keep the Eagles in Philadelphia while Indianapolis did the same
to lure the Colts away from Baltimore, situations that developed partly because of the NFL's control
over expansion. Finally, the agency could ensure that the fans were a factor in league decisionmaking by approving ticket prices, arbitrating labor disputes to eliminate strikes, and controlling the
leagues' arrangements with network television to allow for the broadcast of games on non-network
or pay television.
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tween the owners and NFLPA. These exemptions have severely limited
the application of federal antitrust law to industry restraints.
As a result of these exemptions, the level of competition common
among employers in other industries does not exist in professional football. In fact, NFL owners operate in a market best described as monopolistic. 391 At the same time, this lack of competition, together with the
unique nature of the employment relationship in professional sports, has
essentially rendered the application of federal labor law meaningless.
The procedures and substance of the NLRA are simply not suited for
employees and employers in a monopolistic industry with the type of
employment relationship that exists in professional sports.
Repealing one or both of the antitrust exemptions or amending the
NLRA undoubtedly would help further the objectives of federal labor
and antitrust law. Yet, no single measure will bring the industry within
the scope of these laws. Instead, a combination of measures is necessary
to achieve the goals of labor and antitrust policy. The following combination of legislative and judicial action advance both federal labor and
antitrust policies.
1. Congress should amend the substantive provisions of the
NLRA to accommodate the unique nature of the employment relationship in professional sports and to provide the parties with predictable
rules regarding the scope of lawful and unlawful conduct. A number
of changes-such as expedited unfair labor practice proceedings, an
expanded use of injuctive relief under § 10(j) of the Act, an enumeration of mandatory and non-mandatory subjects within the industry, a
more clearly defined policy regarding the scope of the labor exemption,
and an enunciation the NLRB's primary jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
courts with respect to disputes encompassing both federal antitrust and
labor law--could be tailored to recognize the unique nature of professional sports. Congress also should incorporate a system of fines into
the remedial provisions of the Act to discourage conduct that undermines the policies of federal labor law.
2. The Minnesota district court should outline the type of system
regulating free agency that might satisfy the rule of reason. 392 Judicial
guidelines regarding the reasonableness of free agent restrictions would
foster both antitrust and labor policy. Upon expiration of the collec391. See NFL v. USFL, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding NFL had monopoly
power), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1987).
392. Precedent exists for the court to define a "reasonable" free agent system. In Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the District of Columbia Circuit, after
condemning the NFL's amateur draft, suggested several less restrictive alternatives that would contribute to the League's goal of competitive balance without violating the antitrust laws. More recently, the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th
Cir. 1980), offered procedural suggestions to bring League rules governing the movement of one
franchise into the home territory of another franchise under the protection of the rule of reason. Id.
at 1201.
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tive bargaining agreement, the League, provided it first bargained to
impasse, would have the right under the NLRA to unilaterally imple393
ment a system that fell within the scope of the court's guidelines.
Thus, the League could prevent the total chaos it fears would result
from the complete and immediate elimination of the restrictions on
free agency. More importantly, the League's action would be consistent with federal labor and antitrust law. In the event that the League
thought it needed a more restrictive system, it would have an incentive
to bargain with the union regarding such a system. To the extent that
the League negotiated a more restrictive system, federal labor policy
fostering collective bargaining would prevail over antitrust policy, and
the more restrictive system would be immunized from antitrust attack
by virtue of the nonstatutory labor exemption.
3. Finally, Congress should, in exchange for the preservation of
the current statutory antitrust exemptions, require the League to provide an economic incentive for teams to win on the playing field. This
could be accomplished by simply requiring the League to establish a
pool of money to be distributed to the divisional winners and championship teams. The League always has argued that, because of the
unique nature of the industry, teams cannot be expected to compete
with each other for market share in the same manner that employers in
other industries compete with each other; the owners' product is
jointly produced and no team has an economic incentive to drive another team from the market. 394 While this argument has merit, it does
not justify the complete negation of federal antitrust policy within the
context of the NFL. To further the policies of federal antitrust law,
the League should be required to compete in a manner that is consistent with the unique nature of its product. The Chicago Bears do not
have an incentive to drive the Minnesota Vikings out of business, but
the Bears management should have an economic incentive to defeat
the Vikings on the playing field. In the absence of such incentive, no
guarantee exists that amending the NLRA or establishing reasonable
parameters for restrictions on free agency will result in competitive
bidding for free agents.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In his opening statement in the Mackey case in 1975, NFL attorney
Jim McKay addressed the district court: "Your honor, this case is
brought by some young men who have grown rich beyond their wildest
dreams by this great system which they now malign." The district court
apparently failed to recognize the significance of this observation and
concluded that the system maligned by the wealthy plaintiffs was aperse
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Unfortunately, the NFL, media, and the fans still believe that, because the average salary in the NFL
393. See, eg., Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 64-66 (1964).
394. See, e.g., United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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exceeds $200,000, the players have no right to seek the elimination of
restrictions on free agency.
The NFL's right of first refusal/compensation system is an intraleague rule designed to prevent teams from engaging in competitive bidding for veteran free agents. Absent union approval for such a system,
NFL owners should be forced to eliminate this system and exercise the
same fiscal responsibility and good business judgment exercised by employers in other industries, and in fact by themselves in their business
dealings outside of the NFL. Regardless of the average salary of NFL
players, players have a right to decide where they will work and to receive salaries determined in a competitive market. "If the players be regarded as quasi-peons, it is of no moment that they are well paid; only
the totalitarian minded will believe that high pay excuses virtual
'39 5
slavery.
The facts in the current dispute between the NFL owners and
NFLPA are simple. The NFL's right of first refusal/compensation system, notwithstanding the recent liberalization of that system, almost certainly violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. The union has indicated
unequivocally that it opposes the continuation of that system. Unless the
owners entice the players to accept the system in exchange for other benefits, no court could conclude that a continuation of this restraint could
be the product of good faith, arm's-length bargaining in the current
negotiations.
Congress, in enacting the NLRA, contemplated that labor and management would determine their own terms and conditions of employment
through collective bargaining and, if necessary, the use of economic
weapons. The nonstatutory labor exemption is a judicial recognition of
this objective. The exemption fosters and protects the collective bargaining process; it elevates the policy of collective bargaining embodied in the
NLRA above federal antitrust law to exempt certain restraints agreed to
during the collective bargaining process. Neither Congress nor the
courts, however, contemplated that the labor exemption would be applied to permit a party with significantly greater bargaining leverage to
unilaterally dictate terms or conditions of employment that violate federal antitrust law.
The NLRB's failure to resolve promptly management's refusal-tobargain charge has prevented the Minnesota district court from promptly
resolving the question of whether the labor exemption has expired. As a
result, the current NFL-NFLPA dispute was not resolved prior to the
395. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (citing
Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1949)).
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start of the 1989 season. Because of the continuous execution of individual contracts that do not necessarily coincide with the length of the collective bargaining agreement, and because of the twenty-five percent
yearly employee turnover rate and the seasonal nature of employment in
the industry, this delay could ultimately prevent a just resolution of the
underlying antitrust dispute between the parties.
By concluding that the exemption expired with the agreement, the
Minnesota district court could have contributed to a prompt resolution
of this dispute. Instead, the court focused its legal analysis on specific
principles of federal labor law and adopted a test that has prolonged the
resolution of the antitrust issues raised by the players. By focusing solely
on principles of federal labor law, the court failed to achieve the underlying purpose of the labor exemption.
The NLRA was designed for industrial employees. It was not
designed for professional employees with d wide range of skills, short
careers, and seasonal employment. Thus, neither the procedures nor
substantive provisions of the Act accommodate the unique employment
relationship in professional sports. Similarly, the antitrust laws were
designed for industries in which firms compete on an economic basis for
market share. They were not designed for an industry in which the product must be jointly produced by a group of competitors who, because of a
congressional exemption from the antitrust laws, share industry revenues. As a result, the Board and the courts have been forced to interpret
and apply federal labor and antitrust statutes within the context of an
industry which is unlike industries for which these statutes were
designed. Not surprisingly, courts have struggled and disagreed over the
application of legal doctrine involving this intersection of federal labor
and antitrust law.
Perhaps the only way to ensure an appropriate and consistent application of the antitrust and labor laws to the NFL is to amend these laws
to accommodate the unique employment relationship in the industry and
to eliminate the current legislative exemptions to the antitrust laws. In
the absence of either of these alternatives and in light of the bargaining
history between the NFL owners and NFLPA and the unique nature of
the professional sports industry, only one application of the labor exemption to the facts in this dispute properly accommodates competing antitrust and labor policies. The labor exemption expired on August 31,
1987, the day the 1982 NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement
expired. This application of the exemption would have eliminated the
current delay and resolved questions concerning the Board's primary jurisdiction and the court's authority to determine the presence or absence
of good faith bargaining. More importantly, this application of the labor
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exemption would foster collective bargaining without completely subverting federal antitrust policy. The Minnesota district court failed to
adopt this application of the exemption. For the sake of future collective
bargaining in the NFL, the Eighth Circuit now has an opportunity to
correct the district court's error.

